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Abstract
Sponsored Search Auctions (SSAs) constitute one of the most successful ap-
plications of microeconomic mechanisms. In mechanism design, auctions are
usually designed to incentivize advertisers to bid their truthful valuations
and, at the same time, to guarantee both the advertisers and the auction-
eer a non–negative utility. Nonetheless, in sponsored search auctions, the
Click–Through–Rates (CTRs) of the advertisers are often unknown to the
auctioneer and thus standard truthful mechanisms cannot be directly applied
and must be paired with an effective learning algorithm for the estimation
of the CTRs. This introduces the critical problem of designing a learning
mechanism able to estimate the CTRs at the same time as implementing
a truthful mechanism with a revenue loss as small as possible compared to
the mechanism that can exploit the true CTRs. Previous work showed that,
when dominant–strategy truthfulness is adopted, in single–slot auctions the
problem can be solved using suitable exploration–exploitation mechanisms
able to achieve a cumulative regret (on the auctioneer’s revenue) of order
O˜(T
2
3 ), where T is the number of times the auction is repeated. It is also
known that, when truthfulness in expectation is adopted, a cumulative re-
IA short, early version of this paper was presented at the ACM Conference on Electronic
Commerce 2012 as: N. Gatti, A. Lazaric, F. Trovo`, A truthful learning mechanism for
contextual multi–slot sponsored search auctions with externalities, in: Proceedings of the
ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (ACM EC), 2012, pp. 605–622.
Email addresses: nicola.gatti@polimi.it (Nicola Gatti),
alessandro.lazaric@inria.fr (Alessandro Lazaric), marco.rocco@polimi.it (Marco
Rocco), francesco1.trovo@polimi.it (Francesco Trovo`)
Preprint submitted to Artificial Intelligence Journal June 2, 2015
gret (over the social welfare) of order O˜(T
1
2 ) can be obtained. In this paper
we extend the results available in the literature to the more realistic case of
multi–slot auctions. In this case, a model of the user is needed to characterize
how the CTR of an ad changes as its position in the allocation changes. In
particular, we adopt the cascade model, one of the most popular models for
sponsored search auctions, and we prove a number of novel upper bounds
and lower bounds on both auctioneer’s revenue loss and social welfare w.r.t.
to the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) auction. Furthermore, we report nu-
merical simulations investigating the accuracy of the bounds in predicting
the dependency of the regret on the auction parameters.
Keywords: Economic paradigms, mechanism design, online learning,
sponsored search auctions.
1. Introduction
SSAs constitute one of the most successful applications of microeconomic
mechanisms, producing a revenue of about $6 billion dollars in the US alone
in the first half of 2010 [1]. In a SSA, a number of advertisers bids to have
their sponsored links (from here on ads) displayed in some slot alongside the
search results of a keyword. SSAs currently adopt the pay–per–click payment
scheme, which requires positive payments from an advertiser only when its
ad is clicked. Given an allocation of ads over the available slots, each ad is
associated with a CTR, corresponding to the probability of being clicked by
the user. CTRs play a crucial role in the definition of the auction, since the
auctioneer relies on (estimates of) the CTRs to determine the allocation of
ads over slots and to compute the payment of each ad. Models similar to
SSAs are also used in many other advertisement applications. For instance,
in contextual advertising, the text of a website is scanned for keywords and
an auction is used to select the ads to display in vertical/horizontal slots on
the basis of the advertisers’ bids and CTRs of the ads in the given context [2].
In microeconomic literature, SSAs have been formalized as a mechanism
design problem [3], where the objective is to design an auction that incen-
tivizes advertisers to bid their truthful valuations (needed for economic sta-
bility) and that guarantees both the advertisers and the auctioneer to have a
non–negative utility. The most common SSA mechanism is the Generalized
Second Price (GSP) auction [4, 5]. As shown in [4], this mechanism is not
truthful and advertisers may implement bidding strategies that pay more
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than bidding their truthful valuations.
While the GSP is still popular in many SSAs, the increasing evidence
of its limits is strongly pushing towards the adoption of the more appealing
Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism, which is already successfully em-
ployed in the related scenario of contextual advertising, by Google [2] and
Facebook [6]. The first drawback of the GSP is that its equilibria may be
inefficient (in terms of social welfare) w.r.t. the VCG outcome: consider-
ing the whole set of Nash equilibria in full information, the Price of Anarchy
(PoA) of the GSP is upper bounded by about 1.6, while considering the set of
Bayes–Nash equilibria the PoA is upper bounded by about 3.1 [7]. Similarly,
the revenue of a (full information) Nash equilibrium can be arbitrarily small
w.r.t. the VCG outcome, while in the Bayesian case the revenue is upper
bounded by 6 [8]. Furthermore, the automated bidding strategies, used in
practice by the advertisers to find their best bids, may not even converge to
any Nash equilibrium and, under mild assumptions, the states they converge
to are shown to be arbitrarily inefficient [9]. When externalities are intro-
duced, it is known that no Nash equilibrium of the GSP provides a larger
revenue than the VCG outcome [10, 11]. Finally, there is a recent increase
in the use of additional features (such as larger formats, reviews, maps, or
phone numbers) arranged by the search engines on the web page together
with the ads to increase the attention of the user. It is known that the GSP
behaves poorly in this setting, while the VCG is almost equivalent to the
standard setting [12].
In this paper, we focus on the problem of designing truthful mechanisms
when the CTRs are not known and need to be estimated in SSAs with mul-
tiple slots. This problem is particularly relevant in practice because the
assumption that all the CTRs are known beforehand is rarely realistic. Fur-
thermore, it also poses interesting scientific challenges since it represents one
of the first examples where online learning theory and mechanism design—
two important fields in artificial intelligence that recently received a lot of
attention in the literature—are paired to obtain effective methods to learn
under equilibrium constraints (notably the truthfulness property). For the
sake of completeness, we remark that the combination of these ideas have
been used also in the other fields, e.g., crowdsourcing [13].
Related works. The problem of estimating the CTRs and identifying
the best allocation of ads can be effectively formalized as a Multi–Armed
Bandit (MAB) problem [14], where each ad is an arm and the objective is
to minimize the cumulative regret either on the auctioneer’s revenue or the
3
social welfare, i.e., the difference in revenue or social welfare, respectively,
of the mechanisms implemented over time estimating the CTRs and of the
mechanisms that can exploit the true CTRs. The problem of budgeted ad-
vertisers (i.e., auctions where the total amount of money each advertiser
is willing to pay is limited) with multiple queries is considered in [15]. This
problem is formalized as a budgeted multi–bandit multi–arm problem, where
each bandit corresponds to a query, and an algorithm is proposed with the-
oretical guarantees on auctioneer revenue regret. Nonetheless, the proposed
method works in a non–strategic environment, where advertisers do not try
to influence the outcome of the auction and always bid their true values. The
strategic dimension of SSAs is partially taken into consideration in [16], where
the advertisers are assumed to play a bidding strategy at the equilibrium of
the GSP w.r.t. a set of estimated CTRs available to both the auctioneer
and the advertisers. The authors introduce a learning algorithm which ex-
plores different rankings of the ads to improve the CTR estimates and, at
the same time, to avoid that the advertisers have incentives to deviate from
the aforementioned equilibrium strategy. In [17, 18], the authors formulate
for the first time the problem of designing truthful learning mechanisms ac-
cording to the notion of truthfulness in high probability in multi–slot SSAs.
The single–slot online advertising is studied also in [19] where the notion of
Bayesian Incentive Compatibility (BIC) is taken into consideration and an
asymptotically BIC and ex ante efficient mechanism is introduced.
The most complete study of truthful bandit mechanisms so far is re-
ported in [20] and [21]. These works provide a complete analysis on the
constraints that truthfulness forces on the MAB algorithm with single–slot
SSAs, proving that no dominant–strategy truthful bandit mechanism can
achieve a regret (over social welfare or auctioneer’s revenue) smaller than
Ω˜(T
2
3 ) and that the exploration and exploitation phases must be separate.1,2
The lower bound over the regret holds also when the truthfulness is in expec-
tation w.r.t. the click realizations. Finally, they also provide nearly–optimal
1The O˜/Ω˜/Θ˜ notation hides both constant and logarithmic factors, i.e., we say the
regret is O˜(T
2
3 ) if there exist a and b such that the regret is ≤ aT 23 logb T .
2The need for having separated phases between exploration and exploitation to limit
the strategic manipulation of the mechanism is underlined also in [16], where the authors
study learning approaches for the GSP. Interestingly, experimental simulations show that
having exploration phases in which no payment is applied can allow the auctioneer to have
even a short–term gain [22].
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algorithms matching the lower bound on the regret. In both [20] and [21],
advertisers’ utility is not subject to any form of time discount, in contrast
with what happens in practice, where advertisers may favor early small gains
over larger gains in the future. However, the mechanisms introduced in [20]
and [21] are truthful even in presence of discount since the sharp separation
of exploration and exploitation would still force advertisers with discounting
to reveal their true valuation.3 When the notion of truthfulness is relaxed,
adopting truthfulness in expectation w.r.t. the mechanism randomness, it is
possible to obtain in the case of single–slot SSAs a regret O˜(T
1
2 ) (over the so-
cial welfare) without separating the exploration and exploitation phases [23].
When multiple slots are present, a user model is needed to describe how
the CTR of an ad changes as its position in the allocation changes. All
the models available in the literature assume that the CTR is given by the
product of two terms: the probability that an ad is clicked once observed
by the user, and the probability that the user observes an ad given the
complete allocation of ads over slots. The basic model (commonly referred
to as separability model) prescribes that the probability of observing an ad
depends only on its position [3]. Recently, more accurate models have been
proposed and one of the most popular models is the cascade model. According
to this model, the user scans the slots from top to bottom and the probability
that she moves from a given slot to the next depends on the former slot itself
and the identity of the ad displayed in it (this kind of user is commonly called
Markovian user) [24, 25]. As a result, the overall probability of observing an
ad depends on the slot in which it is displayed and on all the ads allocated
above it. The validity of the cascade model has been evaluated and supported
by a wide range of experimental investigations [26, 27]. The only results on
learning mechanisms for SSAs with multiple slots are described in [28], where
the authors characterize dominant–strategy truthful mechanisms and provide
theoretical bounds over the social welfare regret for the separability model.
However, these results are partial (e.g., they do not consider the common
case in which the slot–dependent parameters are monotonically decreasing
over slots), and they cannot be easily extended to the more challenging case
of the cascade model (see Section 3.3).
3In our paper, we focus on the no–discount case and we use learning mechanisms that
separate the phases of exploration and exploitation. As in [20] and [21], our learning
mechanisms keep to be truthful even when discounting is present.
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Original contributions. In the present paper, we build on the results
available in the literature and we extend the partial results presented in [29]
to a wider range of cases, providing also a number of contributions when the
separability model and the cascade model are adopted. More precisely, our
results can be summarized as follows.
• Separability model with monotonically decreasing parameters/only position–
dependent cascade model. In this case, there are two groups of pa-
rameters, one related to the ads (called quality) and one to the slots
(called prominence). We studied all the configurations of information
incompleteness. When only qualities are unknown, we provide a non–
randomized learning mechanism that is dominant–strategy truthful a
posteriori w.r.t. the click realizations and with a regret of O˜(T
2
3 ) (while
it is an open problem whether it is possible to obtain a better upper
bound adopting truthfulness in expectation).4 When only prominences
are unknown, we provide a non–randomized learning mechanism that
is dominant–strategy truthful in expectation w.r.t. the click realiza-
tions with a regret of 0 and a randomized learning mechanism that
is dominant–strategy truthful in expectation w.r.t. the realizations of
the random component of the mechanism with a regret of O(1). We
also show that any dominant–strategy truthful a posteriori w.r.t. all
the sources of randomness learning mechanism would have a regret of
Θ(T ). When both groups of parameters are unknown, we provide a
random learning mechanism that is dominant–strategy truthful in ex-
pectation only w.r.t. the realizations of the random component of the
mechanism with a regret of O˜(T
2
3 ).
• Cascade model : in the non–factorized cascade model (i.e., when the ob-
servation probabilities can be arbitrary) we show that it is possible to
obtain a regret of O˜(T
2
3 ) in dominant–strategy truthful in expectation
w.r.t. all the sources of randomness learning mechanisms when only the
qualities of the ads are unknown.5 We show also that in the factorized
cascade model (i.e., when the observation probabilities are the products
4This result has already been presented in [29] and is here reported for sake of com-
pleteness.
5A preliminary version of this result has already been presented in [29] and was here re-
fined in its dependence from the number of slots K and ads N , changing from O˜(T
2
3K
2
3N)
to O˜(T
2
3K
4
3N
1
3 ), as postulated in the aforementioned paper.
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of terms depending on either the slot or the ads as used in [24]), any
non–randomized learning mechanism that is dominant–strategy truth-
ful (even in expectation w.r.t. the click realizations) has a regret of Θ(T )
even in the special case in which only the ad–dependent parameters are
unknown (while it is an open problem whether it is possible to obtain
a better upper bound adopting a randomized mechanism and truthful-
ness in expectation w.r.t. the realization of the random component of
the mechanism).
• Learning parameters : for each setting described above we provide prac-
tical guidelines on how the learning parameters can be tuned to mini-
mize the bound over the regret depending on the characteristics of the
auction (e.g., number of slots and advertisers).
• Numerical simulations : we investigate the accuracy of all the theo-
retical regret bounds in predicting the dependency of the regret on
the auction parameters by numerical simulations. We show that the
theoretical asymptotic dependency matches the actual dependency we
observed by simulation.
Paper organization. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
we briefly review the basics of mechanism design and MAB learning. In
Section 3, we formalize SSAs, introduces the corresponding online learning
mechanism design problem, and it provides a more formal overview of exist-
ing results and the new findings of this paper. In Sections 4 and 5, we report
and discuss the main regret bounds in the case of position–dependent and
position– and ad–dependent externalities. In Section 6, we report numerical
simulations aiming at testing the accuracy of the theoretical bounds. Sec-
tion 7 concludes the paper and proposes future directions of investigation.
The detailed proofs of the theorems are reported in appendix.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Economic Mechanisms
In this section we provide an overview on the definitions and results of
mechanism design that are relevant to the paper. The objective of mech-
anism design [30] is to design allocation and payment functions satisfying
some desirable properties when agents are rational and retain private in-
formation representing their preferences—also referred to as the type of the
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agent. Without loss of generality, mechanism design focuses on specific mech-
anisms, called direct, in which the only action available to the agents is to
report their (potentially non–truthful) type. On the basis of the agents’ re-
ports the mechanism determines the allocation of resources to agents and the
agents’ payments.
The main desirable property of a mechanism is truthfulness, often re-
ferred to as Incentive Compatibility (IC), which requires that reporting the
true types constitutes an equilibrium strategy profile for the agents.6 When
a mechanism is not truthful, agents should try to optimize their (untruth-
ful) strategies on the basis of some model about the opponents’ behavior,
but, in absence of common information, no normative model for rational
agents exists. This leads the mechanism to be economically unstable, given
that the agents continuously change their strategies. Different notions of
truthfulness are available. The most common ones are Dominant Strategy
Incentive Compatibility (DSIC)—i.e., reporting the true types is the best
action an agent can play independently of the actions of the other agents—,
ex post incentive compatibility (ex post IC)—i.e., reporting the true types is a
Nash equilibrium—, and BIC—i.e., reporting the true types is a Bayes–Nash
equilibrium. Interestingly, DSIC and ex post IC are equivalent notions of
truthfulness in absence of interdependency among the types of the agents,
while BIC is weaker than DSIC, since it only requires that every agent has
a Bayesian prior over the types of the other agents and IC is defined in ex-
pectation w.r.t. the prior. When there are other sources of randomness in
the mechanism design problem (not due to the distribution of probabilities
over the types of the agents), e.g., random components of the mechanism or
the realization of events, weaker solution concepts, said in expectation, are
commonly adopted, e.g., DSIC in expectation or ex post IC in expectation.
Instead, we use the term “a posteriori” when the truthfulness holds for every
realization. In presence of multiple sources of randomness, a mechanism may
be in expectation w.r.t. some sources and a posteriori w.r.t. other sources.
When we use only DSIC a posteriori without specifying the source of ran-
domness, we mean DSIC a posteriori w.r.t. all the sources of randomness.
Moreover, mechanisms can exploit the realizations of the events adopting
different payment functions for each different realization. These mechanisms
are said Execution Contingent (EC) [31, 32].
6We use the same acronym also for ‘Incentive Compatible’ referred to a mechanism.
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In addition to IC, other desirable properties include: Allocative Efficiency
(AE)—i.e., the allocation maximizes the social welfare—, Individual Ratio-
nality (IR)—i.e., each agent is guaranteed to have no loss when reporting
truthfully—, and Weak Budget Balance (WBB)—i.e., the mechanism is guar-
anteed to have no loss. In presence of sources of randomness, IR and WBB
can be in expectation w.r.t. all the possible realizations, or a posteriori if
they hold for every possible realization. As for IC, in presence of multiple
sources of randomness, these properties may be in expectation w.r.t. some
sources and a posteriori w.r.t. other sources. When we use only IR (or WBB)
a posteriori without specifying the source of randomness, we mean IR (or
WBB) a posteriori w.r.t. all the sources of randomness.
The economic literature provides an important characterization of the al-
location functions that can be adopted in IC mechanisms when utilities are
quasi linear [30]. Here, we survey the main results related to DSIC mecha-
nisms where no sources of randomness are present. In unrestricted domains
(i.e., the agents’ types are defined over spaces with arbitrary structure) for the
agents’ preferences, only weighted maximal–in–its–range allocation functions
can be adopted in DSIC mechanisms [33, 34]. More precisely, a weighted
maximal–in–its–range allocation function chooses, among a subset of allo-
cations that does not depend on the types reported by the agents (i.e., the
range), the allocation maximizing the weighted social welfare, where each
agent is associated with a positive (type–independent) weight. It trivially
follows that, when the range is composed of all the possible allocations and
all the agents have the same weights, only AE mechanisms can be DSIC.
When weighted maximal–in–its–range allocation functions are adopted, only
weighted Groves payments lead to DSIC mechanisms [30]. The most com-
mon DSIC mechanism is the VCG [30], in which the range is composed of
all the allocations and all the weights are unitary. The idea of the VCG
mechanism is that each agent pays the difference between the social welfare
of the optimal outcome when she does not participate to the mechanism and
the social welfare of the outcome obtained when she participates minute its
contribution. (We leave a more formal and detailed description of the VCG
mechanism to Appendix A.) Notice that the VCG mechanism satisfies also
IR and WBB and, among all the Groves mechanisms, it is the one maximiz-
ing the revenue of the auctioneer. We refer to the weighted version of the
VCG as Weighted Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (WVCG).
When the domain of the agents’ preferences is restricted (i.e., the types
are defined over spaces with specific structure, e.g., compact sets or discrete
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values), weighted maximal–in–its–range property is not necessary for DSIC.
The necessary condition is weakly monotonicity [30], which is also sufficient
for convex domains. In specific restricted domains, weak monotonicity leads
to simple and operational tools. For instance, when the preferences of the
agents are single–parameter linear—i.e., the agents’ value is given as the
product between the agent’s type and an allocation–dependent coefficient
called load [35]—, monotonicity requires that the load is monotonically in-
creasing in the type of the agent. In this case, any DSIC mechanism is based
on the Myerson’s payments defined in [35, 36].7 Notice that the VCG mech-
anism is still the mechanism maximizing the auctioneer’s revenue among all
the DSIC mechanisms, including those that are not AE. The Myerson’s pay-
ments include an integral that may be not easily computable. However, by
adopting a random mechanism and accepting DSIC in expectation w.r.t. the
realizations of the random component of the mechanism, such integral can be
easily estimated by using samples [37]. Another drawback of the payments
described in [35, 36] is that they require the off–line evaluation of the social
welfare of the allocations for some agents’ types different from the reported
ones and this may be not possible in many practical situations. A way to
overcome this issue is to adopt the result presented in [23], in which the
authors propose an implicit way to calculate the payments. More precisely,
given an allocation function in input, a random component is introduced such
that with a small probability the reported types of the agents are modified to
obtain the allocations that are needed to compute the payments in [35, 36].
The resulting allocation function is less efficient than the allocation function
given in input, but the computation of the payments is possible and it is
executed online.
2.2. Multi–Armed Bandit
The MAB [14] is a simple yet powerful framework formalizing the online
decision–making problem under uncertainty. Historically, the MAB frame-
work finds its motivation in optimal experimental design in clinical trials,
where two treatments, say A and B, need to be tested. In an idealized ver-
sion of the clinical trial, T patients are sequentially enrolled in the trial, so
that whenever a treatment is tested on a patient, the outcome of the test
7See Appendix B for the definition of monotonicity in single–parameter linear environ-
ments and Myerson’s payments.
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is recorded and it is used to choose which treatment to provide to the next
patient. The objective is to provide the best treatment to the largest number
of patients. This raises the challenge of balancing the collection of informa-
tion and the maximization of the performance of the trial, a problem usually
referred to as the exploration–exploitation trade–off. On the one hand, it
is important to gather information about the effectiveness of the two treat-
ments by repeatedly providing them at different patients (exploration). On
the other hand, as the estimate of effectiveness of the treatments becomes
more accurate, the (estimated) best treatment should be selected more often
(exploitation). This scenario matches with a large number of applications,
such as online advertisements, adaptive routing, and cognitive radio.
In general, the MAB framework can be adopted whenever a set of N arms
(e.g., treatments, ads) is available and the rewards (e.g., effectiveness of a
treatment, CTR of an ad) associated with each of them are random real-
izations from unknown distributions. Although this problem can be solved
by dynamic programming methods and notably by using the Gittins index
solution [38], this requires a prior over the distribution of the reward of
the arms and it is often computationally heavy (high–degree polynomial in
T ). More recently, a wide range of techniques have been developed to solve
the bandit problem. In particular, these algorithms formalize the objective
using the notion of regret, which corresponds to the difference in perfor-
mance over T steps between an optimal selection strategy which knows in
advance the performance of all the arms and an adaptive strategy which
learns over time which arms to select. Although a complete review of the
bandit algorithms is beyond the scope of this paper (see [39] for a review),
we only discuss two results which are relevant to the rest of the paper. The
exploration–separated algorithms solve the exploration–exploitation trade–off
by introducing a strict separation between the exploration and the exploita-
tion phases. While during the exploration phase all the arms are uniformly
selected, in the exploitation phase only the best estimated arm is selected
until the end of the experiment. The length τ of the exploration phase is
critical to guarantee the success of the experiment and it is possible to show
that, if properly tuned, the worst–case cumulative regret scales as O˜(T
2
3 ),
matching the lower bound Ω˜(T
2
3 ). Another class of algorithms relies on the
construction of confidence intervals for the reward of each arm and it does
not separate exploration and exploitation steps. In particular, the Upper–
Confidence Bound (UCB) algorithm [40] gives an extra exploration bonus to
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arms which have been selected only few times in the past and it achieves
a worst–case cumulative regret of order O˜(T
1
2 ), matching the lower bound
Ω˜(T
1
2 ).
3. Problem statement
In this section we introduce all the notation used throughout the rest
of the paper. In particular, we formalize the SSA model, we define the
mechanism design problem, and we introduce the learning process.
Symbol Description
N Number of ads
N = {1, . . . , N} Set of the ads indexes
ai, i ∈ N i-th ads
qi ∈ [0, 1], i ∈ N Quality for ad ai
V = [0, V ], V ∈ R+ Set of the possible values/types for an ad
vi ∈ V , i ∈ N Value/types for ad ai
vmax = maxi∈N vi Maximum value
v = (v1, . . . , vN) Value profile
v−i = (v1, . . . , vi−1, vi−1, . . . , vN) Value profile excluding the value for the
i-th ad
K,K < N Number of available slots
K = {1, . . . , K} Set of the available slots
sm,m ∈ K m-th slot
K′ = K⋃{K + 1, . . . , N} Extended set of the available slots
θ = {〈sm, ai〉 : m ∈ K′, i ∈ N} Generic allocation
Θ Set of all the possible allocations
pi : N ×Θ→ K′ Given an allocation θ, pi(i; θ) returns the
index of the slot in which ai is allocated
α : K′ ×Θ→ N Given an allocation θ, α(m; θ) returns the
index of the ad allocated in slot sm
γm,i,m ∈ K, i ∈ N Probability that a user, observing ad ai in
slot sm, observes the ad in the next slot
sm+1
Γm(θ),m ∈ K, θ ∈ Θ Cumulative probability that a user ob-
serves the ad displayed at slot sm in al-
location θ
12
SW(θ,v) Social welfare of allocation θ for ads with
values profile v
λm ∈ [0, 1],m ∈ K Prominence associated with slot sm
ci ∈ [0, 1], i ∈ N Continuation probability associated with
ad ai
clickim(t) ∈ {0, 1} No–click/click event for the ad ai allocated
in slot sm at step t
f : VN → Θ Allocation function
pi : VN → R Payment function for the i-th ad
vˆi Reported value for ad ai
vˆ = (vˆ1, . . . , vˆN) Reported value profile
vˆ−i = (vˆ1, . . . , vˆi−1, vˆi−1, . . . , vˆN) Reported value profile excluding the value
for the i-th ad
θ∗ Allocation that maximizes the social wel-
fare given the reported types
θ∗−i Allocation that maximizes the social wel-
fare given the reported types when adver-
tiser ai is not present
SW−i(θ,v) Cumulative expected value of the alloca-
tion θ minus the expected value of adver-
tiser ai
RT (A) Expected revenue regret of algorithm A
over T steps
RSWT (A) Expected social welfare regret of algorithm
A over T steps
Table 1: Notation adopted throughout the paper.
3.1. SSA model
We resort to the standard model of SSAs [3]. The notation described in
the sequel is summarized in Tab. 1. We denote by N = {1, . . . , N} the set
of ads indexes and by ai with i ∈ N the i–th ad (we assume w.l.o.g. each
advertiser has only one ad and therefore we can identify by ai the i–th ad
and the i–th advertiser indifferently). Each ad ai is characterized by a quality
qi corresponding to the probability that ai is clicked once observed by the
user, and by the a value vi ∈ V = [0, V ] that ai receives when clicked (ai
receives a value of zero if not clicked). We denote by v the profile (v1, . . . , vN)
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and by v−i the profile obtained by removing vi from v. While the qualities
{qi}i∈N may be known by the auctioneer with some level of accuracy, the
values {vi}i∈N are private information of the advertisers. We denote by
K = {1, . . . , K} with K < N , the set of slot indexes and by sm, with m ∈ K,
the m–th slot from top to bottom. For notational convenience, we also define
the extended set of slots indexes K′ = K ∪ {K + 1, . . . , N}.8
We use the ordered pair 〈sm, ai〉 to indicate that ad ai is allocated to
slot sm, while we denote by θ an allocation, defined as a collection of pairs
〈sm, ai〉, and by Θ the set of all the possible allocations. Although in an
auction only K ads can be actually displayed, we define an allocation as
θ = {〈sm, ai〉 : m ∈ K′, i ∈ N} where both m and i occur exactly once and
any ad assigned to a slot sm with m > K is not displayed. We define two
maps pi : N × Θ → K′ and α : K′ × Θ → N such that pi(i; θ) returns the
index of the slot in which ai is displayed in allocation θ and α(m; θ) returns
the index of the ad displayed in slot sm in allocation θ. Given θ ∈ Θ, we
have that pi(i; θ) = m if and only if α(m; θ) = i.
With more than one slot, it is necessary to adopt a model of the user
describing how the value of an advertiser varies over the slots. We assume
that the user behaves according to the cascade model defined by [24, 25]. In
the cascade model, the user’s behavior is defined by a Markov chain whose
possible states correspond to the slots, which are observed sequentially from
the top to the bottom, and a transition matrix that defines, given the current
slot, the probability that the user observes the ad ai displayed in the next
slot or stops observing any other ad. More precisely, the probability may
depend on the index of the slot (i.e., pi(i; θ)), in this case the externalities
are said position–dependent, and/or on the ad that precedes ai in the current
allocation θ (i.e., aα(pi(i;θ)−1;θ)), in this case the externalities are said ad–
dependent.
In the general case, the cascade model can be described by introducing a
set of parameters γm,i defined as the probability that a user, observing ad ai
in slot sm, observes the ad in the next slot sm+1. The probability that a user
observes the ad displayed at slot sm in allocation θ is denoted by Γm(θ) and
8Although K < N is the most common case, the results could be smoothly extended
to K > N .
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it is defined as:
Γm(θ) =

1 if m = 1
m−1∏
l=1
γl,α(l;θ) if 2 ≤ m ≤ K
0 otherwise
. (1)
Given an allocation θ, the CTR of ad ai is the probability to be clicked once
allocated according to θ and it is computed as Γpi(i;θ)(θ)qi, corresponding to
the joint probability that the user arrives at observing the slot in which the
ad is displayed and then clicks on it. Similarly, the CTR of the ad displayed
at slot sm can be computed as Γm(θ)qα(m;θ). We notice that, according to this
model, the user may click multiple different ads at each impression. Given
an allocation θ, the expected value (w.r.t. the click realizations) of advertiser
ai from θ is Γpi(i;θ)(θ)qivi, that is, the product of the CTR Γpi(i;θ)(θ)qi by the
value of the advertiser vi. The advertisers’ cumulative expected value from
allocation θ, commonly referred to as Social Welfare (SW), is:
SW(θ,v) =
N∑
i=1
Γpi(i;θ)(θ)qivi.
In [24, 25], the authors factorize the probability γm,i as the product of two
independent terms: the prominence λm, which only depends on the slot
sm, and the continuation probability ci, which only depends on the ad ai.
9
In [24, 25], the authors factorize the probability γm,i as the product of two
independent terms: the prominence λm, which only depends on the slot sm,
and the continuation probability ci, which only depends on the ad ai.
10
Finally, we denote by clickim ∈ {0, 1} the no–click/click event for ad ai
allocated in slot sm.
9The allocation problem when either all the prominence probabilities λms or all the
continuation probabilities cis are equal to one can be solved in polynomial time, while,
although no formal proof is known, the allocation problem with arbitrary λms and cis is
commonly believed to be NP–hard [24]. However, the allocation problem can be solved
exactly in specific settings, and in many other cases, efficient approximation algorithms
can be used [41]. In this paper, we ignore approximation schemes and we only focus on
optimal allocation functions.
10The allocation problem when either all the prominence probabilities λms or all the
continuation probabilities cis are equal to one can be solved in polynomial time, while,
although no formal proof is known, the allocation problem with arbitrary λms and cis is
commonly believed to be NP–hard [24]. However, the allocation problem can be solved
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3.2. Mechanism design problem
A direct–revelation economic mechanism for SSAs is formally defined as
a tuple (N ,V ,Θ, f, {pi}i∈N ) where N is the set of the agents’ (i.e., the ad-
vertisers) indexes, V is the set of the types of the agents (where the type of
ad ai is the single–parameter valuation vi), Θ is the set of the outcomes (i.e.,
the allocations), f is the allocation function defined as f : VN → Θ, and pi
is the payment function for advertiser ai defined as pi : VN → R. We denote
by vˆi the value reported by advertiser ai to the mechanism, by vˆ the profile
of reported values, and by vˆ−i the profile obtained by removing vˆi from vˆ.
At the beginning of an auction, each advertiser ai reports its value vˆi.
The mechanism chooses the allocation on the basis of the values reported
by the advertisers using f(vˆ) and subsequently computes the payment of
each advertiser ai as pi(vˆ). The expected utility of advertiser ai is defined as
Γpi(i;f(vˆ))(f(vˆ))qivi−pi(vˆ), corresponding to the value expected by advertiser
ai minus the payment prescribed by the payment function. Notice that the
utility is linear in the type of the agent. Since each advertiser is an expected
utility maximizer, it will misreport its value (i.e., vˆi 6= vi) whenever this
may lead to increase its utility. Mechanism design aims at finding an alloca-
tion function f and a vector of payments {pi}i∈N such that some desirable
properties—discussed in Section 2.1—are satisfied [30].
When the parameters qi and γm,i are known, the VCG mechanism satisfies
DSIC in expectation w.r.t. the click realizations, IR in expectation w.r.t. the
click realizations, WBB a posteriori w.r.t. the click realizations, and AE.
DSIC and IR do not hold a posteriori. In the VCG mechanism, the allocation
function, denoted by f ∗, maximizes the SW given the reported types as
θ∗ = f ∗(vˆ) ∈ arg max
θ∈Θ
{SW(θ, vˆ)} (2)
and the payments are defined as
p∗i (vˆ) = SW(θ
∗
−i, vˆ−i)− SW−i(θ∗, vˆ), (3)
where:
• θ∗−i = f ∗(vˆ−i), i.e., the optimal allocation when advertiser ai is not
present in the auction, and
exactly in specific settings, and in many other cases, efficient approximation algorithms
can be used [41]. In this paper, we ignore approximation schemes and we only focus on
optimal allocation functions.
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• SW−i(θ∗, vˆ) =
∑
j∈N ,j 6=i Γpi(j;θ∗)(θ
∗)qj vˆj, i.e., the cumulative expected
value of the optimal allocation θ∗ minus the expected value of advertiser
ai.
The payment of advertiser ai is the difference between the SW that could be
obtained from allocation θ∗−i, computed removing ad ai from the auction, and
the SW of the efficient allocation θ∗ without the contribution of advertiser
ai. In other words, this corresponds to the cost in terms of efficiency of the
presence of ai in the auction. The VCG mechanism can be easily extended to
weighted case (the WVCG mechanism). The weighted SW is SWw(θ,v) =∑N
i=1 Γpi(i;θ)(θ)qiviwi where wi is the weight of advertiser i. In the WVCG,
the allocation maximizing the weighted SW is chosen, while the payment is
defined as pwi (vˆ) =
1
wi
(SWw(θ∗−i, vˆ−i) − SWw−i(θ∗, vˆ)), where SWw−i(θ∗, vˆ)) =∑
j∈N ,j 6=i Γpi(j;θ)(θ)qjvjwj.
The WVCG mechanism is DSIC in expectation w.r.t. the click realiza-
tions and IR in expectation w.r.t. the click realizations, but, WVCG being
a generalization of the VCG, these properties do not hold a posteriori. This
is because an advertiser may have a positive payment even when its ad has
not been clicked. Nonetheless, the mechanism can be easily modified to sat-
isfy DSIC w.r.t. the click realizations and IR a posteriori w.r.t. the click
realizations by using pay–per–click payments p∗,ci as follows:
p∗,ci (vˆ, click
i
pi(i;θ∗)) =
SW(θ∗−i, vˆ−i)− SW−i(θ∗, vˆ)
Γpi(i;θ∗)(θ∗)qi
× clickipi(i;θ∗). (4)
The contingent formulation of the payments is such that E[p∗,ci (vˆ, clickipi(i;θ∗))] =
p∗i (vˆ), where the expectation is w.r.t. the click event, which is distributed as
a Bernoulli random variable with parameter coinciding with the CTR of ad
ai in allocation θ
∗, i.e., Γpi(i;θ∗)(θ∗)qi. Similar definitions hold for the WVCG
mechanism.
3.3. Online learning mechanism design problem
In many practical problems, the parameters (i.e., qi and γm,i) are not
known in advance by the auctioneer and must be estimated at the same time
as the auction is run. This leads to the definition of an iterative process where
the auction is repeated over T steps using different estimates of the CTRs.
This introduces a tradeoff between exploring different possible allocations, so
as to collect information about the parameters, and exploiting the estimated
parameters, so as to implement a truthful high–revenue auction (i.e., a VCG
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mechanism). This problem could be easily cast as a MAB problem [14] and
standard techniques could be used to solve it, e.g., [42]. Nonetheless, such an
approach would completely overlook the strategic dimension of the problem:
advertisers may choose their reported values at each step t ∈ {1 . . . , T} to
influence the outcome of the auction at t and/or in future steps in order to
increase their cumulative utility over all the steps of the horizon T . Thus,
in this context, truthfulness requires that reporting the truthful valuation
maximizes the cumulative utility over the whole horizon T . The truthfulness
can be in dominant strategies if advertisers know everything (including, e.g.,
the ads that will be clicked at each step t if displayed) or in expectation. As
customary, we adopt four forms of truthfulness:
• DSIC a posteriori w.r.t. the click realizations and the realizations of the
random component of the mechanism (if such a component is present),
• DSIC in expectation w.r.t. the click realizations and a posteriori w.r.t.
the realizations of the random component of the mechanism (if such a
component is present),
• DSIC in expectation w.r.t. the realizations of the random component
of the mechanism and a posteriori w.r.t. the click realizations, and
• DSIC in expectation w.r.t. both randomization sources.
Here we face the challenging problem where the exploration–exploitation
dilemma must be solved so as to maximize the revenue of the auction under
the hard constraint of truthfulness. Let A be a mechanism run over T steps.
In particular, we only focus on mechanisms which are (at least) DSIC in
expectation w.r.t. all sources of randomization, since for non-truthful mech-
anisms the dynamics of bids is unpredictable. At each step t, A defines an
allocation θt and prescribes an expected payment pi,t(v) for each ad ai. The
objective of A is to minimize the loss of the auctioneer w.r.t. the revenue
provided by the VCG mechanism computed on the actual parameters, and
to preserve the properties of IR and WBB. More precisely, we measure the
performance of A as its cumulative expected regret over T steps:
RT (A) = T
N∑
i=1
p∗i (v)− E
[
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
pi,t(v)
]
, (5)
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where the expectation is taken w.r.t. the click realizations and the realization
of the random component of the mechanism if present. Indeed, we remark
that the regret is not defined on the basis of the pay–per–click payments
asked on a specific sequence of clicks but on the expected payments pi,t(v).
Furthermore, we notice that since the learning mechanism A estimates the
CTRs from the observed (random) clicks, the expected payments pi,t(v) are
random as well. Finally, the payments are computed on the true valuations
v constant over time since the mechanism A is truthful by definition and
thus the best option for all advertisers is to bid their true value at any
step. The mechanism A is a no–regret mechanism if its per–step regret
RT (A)/T decreases to 0 as T increases, i.e., lim
T→∞
RT (A)/T = 0. Another
popular definition of performance [17, 21] is the SW regret, that measures
the performance of A as follows:
RSWT (A) = T · SW(θ∗,v)− E
[
T∑
t=1
SW(θ˜t,v)
]
, (6)
where θ˜t is the allocation prescribed by the learning mechanism at step t
and the expectation, as before, is taken w.r.t. the click realizations and the
realization of the random component of the mechanism if present. We notice
that minimizing the SW regret RSWT does not coincide with minimizing RT .
In fact, once the quality estimates are accurate enough, such that θt is equal
to θ∗, the SW regret drops to zero. On the other hand, since pi,t(v) is com-
puted according to the estimated qualities, RT (A) might still be positive even
if θt = θ
∗. In addition, we believe that in practical applications, providing
a theoretical bound over the regret of the auctioneer’s revenue is more im-
portant rather than a bound on the regret of the SW. Nevertheless, we show
that the same approach we use to derive the bounds over the auctioneer’s
revenue can be employed to derive similar bounds over the SW. Finally, we
refer to Appendix G for an alternative definition of the regret, related to the
deviation between payments.
The study of the problem when K = 1 is well established in the liter-
ature. More precisely, the properties required to have a mechanism that is
DSIC a posteriori w.r.t. the realizations of the random component of the
mechanism are studied in [20] and it is shown that any learning algorithm
must split the exploration and the exploitation in two separate phases in
order to incentivize the advertisers to report their true values. This condi-
tion has a strong impact on the regret RT (A) of the mechanism. In fact,
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while in a standard bandit problem the distribution–free regret is of order
Ω(T
1
2 ), in single–slot auctions, DSIC a posteriori mechanisms have a regret
Ω(T
2
3 ). The same result holds for DSIC a posteriori w.r.t. the realizations
of the random component of the mechanism and in expectation w.r.t. the
click realizations. In [20], a truthful learning mechanism is designed with
nearly optimal regret of order O˜(T
2
3 ). Similar structural properties for DSIC
a posteriori w.r.t. the click realizations mechanisms are also studied in [21]
and similar lower–bounds are derived for the SW regret. In [23] the authors
show that, by introducing a random component in the allocation function
and resorting to DSIC a posteriori w.r.t. the click realizations and in expec-
tation w.r.t. the realizations of the random component of the mechanism,
the separation of exploration and exploitation phases can be avoided. In this
case, the upper bound over the regret of the SW is O˜(T
1
2 ), thus matching
the best distribution–free bound in standard bandit problems. However, the
payments of this mechanism suffer of potentially high variance, which may
be an undesirable property in practice. Although we expect that this mech-
anism could also achieve a revenue regret of the order of O˜(T
1
2 ), no formal
proof is known.
In this paper, we focus on the study of the problem when K > 1, which
is still mostly unexplored. In this case, a crucial role is played by the CTR
model. While with only one slot, the advertisers’ CTRs coincide to their
qualities qi, with multiple slots the CTRs may also depend on the slots and
the allocation of the other ads. The only results on learning mechanisms for
SSAs with K > 1 are described in [28, 43], where the authors characterize
DSIC a posteriori mechanisms and provide theoretical bounds over the SW
regret. More precisely, the authors assume a simple CTR model in which the
CTR itself depends on the ad ai and the slot sm. This model differs from
the cascade model (see Section 2.1) where the CTR is a more complex func-
tion of the quality qi of an ad and the cumulative probability of observation
Γm(θ), which in general depends on both the slot sm and the full allocation θ
(i.e., the ads allocated before slot sm). It can be easily shown that the model
studied in [28] does not include and, at the same time, is not included by the
cascade model. However, the two models match when the CTRs are sepa-
rable in two terms, in which the first is the agents’ quality and the second
is a parameter in [0, 1] monotonically decreasing over the slots (i.e., only–
position–dependent cascade model). Furthermore, while the cascade model
is supported by an empirical activity which confirms its validity as a model of
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the user behavior [26, 27], the model considered in [28] has not been empiri-
cally studied. In [28], the authors show that when the CTRs are unrestricted
(e.g., they are not strictly monotonically decreasing in the slots), the regret
over the SW is Θ(T ) and therefore at every step (of repetition of the auction)
a non–zero regret is accumulated. In addition, the authors provide necessary
and, in some situations, sufficient conditions to have DSIC a posteriori w.r.t.
the click realizations. More precisely, the authors show that the allocation
function of a mechanism that is DSIC a posteriori w.r.t. the click realizations
must be monotonic a posteriori w.r.t. the click realizations. We recall that,
given vi and v
′
i with v
′
i > vi and called θ = f(vi,v−i) and θ
′ = f(v′i,v−i),
f is monotonic in expectation w.r.t. the click realizations if and only if the
CTR of ad ai in θ
′ is not strictly smaller than the CTR in θ. The definition
of monotonicity a posteriori w.r.t. the click realizations is similar. Given
vi and v
′
i with v
′
i > vi and called θ = f(vi,v−i) and θ
′ = f(v′i,v−i), f is
monotonic a posteriori w.r.t. the click realizations if and only if the ad ai
is clicked in θ′ whenever it would be clicked in θ. However, the authors do
not present in [28] any bound over the regret (except for reporting an ex-
perimental evidence that the regret is Ω(T
2
3 ) when the CTRs are separable).
In [43], the authors preliminarily extend the analysis to the case of the cas-
cade model, showing that, even with only ad–dependent externalities, any
DSIC a posteriori w.r.t. the click realizations mechanism has a regret Θ(T ).
We summarize in Tab. 2 the known results in the literature and, in bold
font, the original results provided in this paper. We first consider the cas-
cade model with only position–dependent externalities analyzing the case
where only the parameters {qi}i∈N are unknown to the auctioneer. We show
that it is possible to obtain a DSIC a posteriori learning mechanism with
a regret Θ˜(T
2
3 ) over the auctioneer’s revenue.11 Similarly, we show that in
this setting, the regret over the SW is Θ˜(T
2
3 ). In Section 4.2, we consider
the opposite case where only the parameters {Λm}m∈K are unknown. We
focus on mechanisms that are DSIC in expectation w.r.t. the click realiza-
tions and a posteriori w.r.t. the random component of the mechanism in
Section 4.2.1, and DSIC in expectation w.r.t. the realizations of the random
component of the mechanism and a posteriori w.r.t. the click realizations in
Section 4.2.2. In the first case we observe that we can obtain a mechanism
11A preliminary version of this result appears in [29].
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slots CTR model unknown solution regret over regret over
parameters concept welfare (RSWT ) revenue (RT )
1 – qi DSIC Θ˜(T
2/3) Θ˜(T 2/3)
DSICeC Θ˜(T 2/3) Θ˜(T 2/3)
DSICeM Θ˜(T 1/2) O˜(T 2/3)
> 1 (unconstrained) CTRi,m CTRi,m DISC Θ(T ) unknown
(unfactorized) cascade qi DISC Θ(T ) Θ(T )
DSICeM Θ(T ) Θ(T )
DSICeC Θ˜(T2/3) Θ˜(T2/3)
γi,s DISCeM Θ(T) Θ(T)
position–dep. cascade / qi DSIC Θ˜(T
2/3) Θ˜(T2/3)
separable CTRi,m DSICeC Θ˜(T
2/3) Θ˜(T2/3)
DSICeM O˜(T2/3) O˜(T2/3)
λm DSIC Θ(T) Θ(T)
DSICeC 0 0
DSICeM O(1) O(1)
qi, λm DSIC Θ(T) Θ(T)
DSICeM O˜(T2/3) O˜(T2/3)
ad–dependent cascade qi DSIC Θ(T ) Θ(T )
DSICeC Θ˜(T2/3) Θ˜(T2/3)
ci DSICeC Θ(T) Θ(T)
qi, ci DSICeC Θ(T) Θ(T)
Table 2: Results available on the regret of learning mechanisms in SSA, with in bold the
original results derived in this paper. ‘DSIC’ stands for ‘DSIC a posteriori ’; ‘DSICeC’
stands for ‘DSIC in expectation w.r.t. the click realizations and a posteriori w.r.t. re-
alizations of the random component of the mechanism’; ‘DSICeM’ stands for ‘DSIC in
expectation w.r.t. realizations of the random component of the mechanism and a posteri-
ori w.r.t. the click realizations’.
with a regret (both over the auctioneer’s revenue and over the SW) of 0, but
the obtained mechanism is WBB only in expectation w.r.t. the click realiza-
tions. In the second scenario, both the regrets are bounded by a constant and
the mechanism is IR a posteriori and WBB in expectation w.r.t. the random
component of the mechanism. In Section 4.2.3, we derive a negative result
on the possibility of having no–regret DSIC a posteriori w.r.t. both sources
of randomness mechanisms. Obviously, this negative result extends to all the
generalizations of the cascade model with only position–dependent external-
ities. We conclude the analysis of the position–dependent model studying, in
Section 4.3, the case where both {Λm}m∈K and {qi}i∈N are unknown by the
auctioneer, showing that it is possible to obtain DSIC in expectation w.r.t.
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the random component of the mechanism and a posteriori w.r.t. the click
realizations mechanisms with bounds of O˜(T
2
3 ) for both kinds of regret.
In Section 5 we study the cascade model with both position– and ad–
dependent externalities. We provide a DSIC in expectation w.r.t. the click
realizations learning algorithm minimizing the regret over the auctioneer’s
revenue when only the parameters {qi}i∈N are unknown.12 Then we provide
a result over the SW regret, where the bound is still Θ˜(T
2
3 ). Finally, in
Section 5.2, we consider other situations of lack of information obtaining
negative results. More precisely, there is not any no–regret DSIC mechanism
in expectation w.r.t. the click realizations and a posteriori w.r.t. realizations
of the random component of the mechanism when parameters {ci}i∈N are
unknown. This result applies to both kinds of regret and it extends to the
more general cascade model.
4. Learning with Position–Dependent Externalities
In this section we study the multi–slot auctions with only position–
dependent cascade model. The CTRs depend only on the quality of the
ads and on the position of the slots in which the ads are allocated. Formally,
the parameters γm,i coincide with the prominence parameter, i.e., γm,i = λm
for every m ∈ K and i ∈ N . As a result, the cumulative probability of
observation, defined in Eq. 1, reduces to
Λm = Γm(θ) =

1 if m = 1
m−1∏
l=1
λl if 2 ≤ m ≤ K
0 otherwise
, (7)
where we use Λm instead of Γm(θ) for consistency with most of the literature
on position–dependent externalities and to stress the difference w.r.t. to the
general case described in Section 3.1.
When all the parameters are known by the auctioneer, the efficient allo-
cation θ∗ greatly simplifies. In fact, the expected value of an ad ai for an
allocation θ in this case reduces to Λpi(i;θ)qivi and, since the cumulative prob-
abilities of observation are non–increasing over slots, the efficient allocation
12A preliminary version of this result appears in [29]. In the current paper we provide a
more accurate bound filling the gap between the dependence over N and K predicted by
the theoretical bound and the results in the numerical simulation.
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simply needs to allocate the slots in decreasing order of their reported values
in expectation w.r.t. the qualities, i.e., qivˆi. More precisely, for any k ∈ K′,
let max
i∈N
(qivˆi; k) be the operator returning the k–th largest value in the set
{q1vˆ1, . . . , qN vˆN}, then θ∗ is such that, for every m ∈ K′, the ad displayed at
slot sm is
α(m; θ∗) ∈ arg max
i∈N
(qivˆi;m). (8)
This condition also simplifies the definition of the efficient allocation θ∗−i when
ai is removed from N . In fact, for any i, j ∈ N , if pi(j; θ∗) < pi(i; θ∗) (i.e., ad
aj is displayed before ai) then pi(j; θ
∗
−i) = pi(j; θ
∗), while if pi(j; θ∗) > pi(i; θ∗)
then pi(j; θ∗−i) = pi(j; θ
∗)−1 (i.e., ad aj is moved one slot upward), and w.l.o.g.
we assume pi(i; θ∗−i) = N . In case of position–dependent externalities, the
VCG payments p∗i defined in Eq. 3 take the simplified formulation:
p∗i (vˆ) =

K+1∑
l=pi(i;θ∗)+1
[
(Λl−1 − Λl) max
j∈N
(qj vˆj; l)
]
if pi(i; θ∗) ≤ K
0 otherwise
, (9)
which can be written as a per–slot payment as:
p∗α(m;θ∗)(vˆ) =

K+1∑
l=m+1
[
(Λl−1 − Λl) max
i∈N
(qivˆi; l)
]
if m ≤ K
0 otherwise
. (10)
In the following sections we study the problem of designing incentive com-
patible mechanisms under different conditions of lack of information over the
parameters {qi}i∈N and {Λm}m∈K. In particular, in Section 4.1, we assume
that the actual values of {qi}i∈N are unknown by the auctioneer, while those
of {Λm}m∈K are known. In Section 4.2, we assume that the actual values of
{Λm}m∈K are unknown by the auctioneer, while those of {qi}i∈N are known.
Finally, in Section 4.3, we assume that both {qi}i∈N and {Λm}m∈K are un-
known.
4.1. Unknown qualities {qi}i∈N
In this section we assume that the qualities of the ads {qi}i∈N are un-
known, while {Λm}m∈K are known. We initially focus on DSIC a posteriori
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Input: Length of exploration phase τ , confidence δ, position–dependent pa-
rameters {Λm}m∈K
Exploration phase
for t = 1, . . . , τ do
Allocate ads according to (13)
Ask for no payment
Observe the clicks {clickipi(i;θt)(t)}Ni=1
Compute the estimated quality q˜i =
1
|Bi|
∑
t∈Bi
clicki
pi(i;θt)
(t)
Λpi(i;θt)
Compute q˜+i = q˜i + η where η is given by (14)
Exploitation phase
for t = τ + 1, . . . , T do
Allocate ads according to f˜ defined in (16)
For each ad ai, ask for payment p˜
c
i defined in (18)
Figure 1: Pseudo–code for the A–VCG1 mechanism.
mechanisms and subsequently we discuss about DSIC in expectation mech-
anisms.
As in [20, 21], we formalize the problem as a MAB problem and we
study the properties of a learning mechanism where the exploration and
exploitation phases are separated, such that during the exploration phase,
we estimate the values of {qi}i∈N and during the exploitation phase we use
the estimated qualities {q˜i}i∈N to implement a DSIC a posteriori mechanism.
The pseudo code of the algorithm A–VCG1 (Adaptive VCG 1) is given in
Fig. 1. The details of the algorithm follow.
Exploration phase. During an exploration phase of length τ , the algo-
rithm receives as input the parameters {Λm}m∈K and collects data to esti-
mate the quality of each ad. Unlike the single–slot case, where we collect
only one sample of no–click/click event per step, here we can exploit the fact
that each ad ai has a non–zero CTR whenever it is allocated to a slot sm
with m ≤ K. As a result, at each step of the exploration phase, we collect
K samples (no–click/click events), one from each slot. Let θt (for 1 ≤ t ≤ τ)
be a sequence of allocations independent from the advertisers’ bids. Let
Bi = {t : pi(i; θt) ≤ K, ≤ t ≤ τ} be the set of all the steps when ai is
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allocated to a valid slot, so that |Bi| corresponds to the total number of (no–
click/click) samples available for ad ai. We denote by click
i
pi(i;θt)
(t) ∈ {0, 1}
the no–click/click event at step t for ad ai when displayed in slot spi(i;θt).
Depending on the slot in which the click event happens, the ad ai has dif-
ferent CTR, thus we need to weigh each click sample by the probability of
observation Λm related to the slot in which the ad is allocated. As a result,
the estimated quality q˜i is computed as
q˜i =
1
|Bi|
∑
t∈Bi
clickipi(i;θt)(t)
Λpi(i;θt)
. (11)
Since q˜i is an unbiased estimate of qi (i.e., Eclick[q˜i] = qi, where Eclick is the
expectation w.r.t. the click realizations), we can resort to the Hoeffding’s
inequality [44] and a bound over the error of the estimated quality q˜i for
each ad ai.
Proposition 1. For any ad ai, i ∈ N
|qi − q˜i| ≤
√√√√(∑
t∈Bi
1
Λ2pi(i;θt)
)
1
2|Bi|2 log
2N
δ
, (12)
with probability 1− δ (w.r.t. the click realizations).
During the exploration phase, at each step t ∈ {1, . . . , τ}, we adopt the
following sequence of allocations
θt = {〈s1, a(t mod N)+1〉, . . . , 〈sN , a(t+N−1 mod N)+1〉}, (13)
thus obtaining |Bi| = bKτ/Nc for all the ads ai. Given that bKτ/Nc ≥ τK2N ,
Eq. 12 becomes
|qi − q˜i| ≤
√√√√( K∑
m=1
1
Λ2m
)
N
K2τ
log
2N
δ
=: η, (14)
where η represents the accuracy of the estimator.13 The previous inequality
is non-trivial only for a long enough exploration phase. In particular, to
13Notice that, from now on, we realistically assume that all the ads have at least two
samples to initialize their estimates q˜+i . This hypothesis allows us to remove the floor
notation in the bounds and, in the case of A–VCG1, it leads to an exploration time
τ ≥ 2N/K.
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have a meaningful bound, i.e., |qi − q˜i| < 1, the length of the exploration
phase has to be τ >
(∑K
m=1
1
Λ2m
)
N
K2
log 2N
δ
. During this phase, in order to
guarantee DSIC a posteriori, the advertisers cannot be charged with any
payment, i.e., all the payments in steps 1 ≤ t ≤ τ are set to 0. In fact, as
shown in [21], any bid–dependent payment could be easily manipulated by
bidders, thus obtaining a non–truthful mechanism, whereas bid–independent
payments could lead to a non–IR mechanism to which bidders may prefer
not to participate.
Exploitation phase. Once the exploration phase is terminated, an upper–
confidence bound over each quality qi is computed as
q˜+i = q˜i + η, (15)
and the exploitation phase is started and run for the remaining T − τ steps.
We define the upper-confidence bound on the SW as
S˜W(θ, vˆ) =
N∑
i=1
Λpi(i;θ)q˜
+
i vˆi,
and we define f˜ as the allocation function that displays ads in decreasing
order of q˜+i vˆi. Thus f˜ returns the efficient allocation θ˜ on the basis of the
estimated qualities as:
θ˜ = f˜(vˆ) ∈ arg max
θ∈Θ
{S˜W(θ, vˆ)}. (16)
The allocation function f˜ is then run for all the steps of the exploitation
phase. Notice that f˜ is an affine maximizer, since
f˜(vˆ) ∈ arg max
θ∈Θ
N∑
i=1
Λpi(i;θ)q˜
+
i vˆi = arg max
θ∈Θ
N∑
i=1
q˜+i
qi
Λpi(i;θ)qivˆi
= arg max
θ∈Θ
N∑
i=1
wiΛpi(i;θ)qivˆi,
where each weight wi = q˜
+
i /qi is independent of the advertisers’ types vi.
Hence, we can apply the WVCG payments (here denoted by p˜ because of
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the estimated parameters) satisfying the DSIC a posteriori property. In
particular, for any ai, we define the payment
p˜i(vˆ) =
{
1
wi
∑K+1
l=pi(i;θ˜)+1
(Λl−1 − Λl) max
j∈N
(q˜+j vˆj; l) if pi(i; θ˜) ≤ K
0 otherwise
=
{
qi
q˜+i
∑K+1
l=pi(i;θ˜)+1
(Λl−1 − Λl) max
j∈N
(q˜+j vˆj; l) if pi(i; θ˜) ≤ K
0 otherwise
. (17)
Although these payments cannot be computed by the auctioneer, since the
actual {qi}i∈N are unknown, we can resort to the pay–per–click payments
p˜ci(vˆ,click
i
pi(i;θ˜)
) =
p˜i(vˆ)
Λpi(i;θ˜)qi
=
1
Λpi(i;θ˜)q˜
+
i
( K+1∑
l=pi(i;θ˜)+1
(Λl−1 − Λl) max
j∈N
(q˜+j vˆj; l)
)
clicki
pi(i;θ˜)
, (18)
which in expectation coincide with the payments p˜i(vˆ) = E[p˜ci(vˆ, clickipi(i;θ˜))]
and can be computed at run time. Unlike the payments p˜i(vˆ), these payments
can be computed simply relying on the estimates q˜+i and on the knowledge
of the probabilities of observation Λm. The following properties hold for this
mechanism.
Theorem 1. The A–VCG1 is:
• DSIC a posteriori,
• IR a posteriori,
• WBB a posteriori.
Proof. The allocation function is monotonic a posteriori w.r.t. the click
realizations since, by the nature of the externality model, each click realiza-
tion plan prescribing that an ad is clicked in a given slot prescribes also that
the same ad would be clicked in all the slots above. Thus, DSIC a posteriori
trivially follows from the fact that the mechanism is a WVCG mechanism
and that the payments are pay–per–click. 
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We now move to the analysis of the performance of A–VCG1 in terms of
the regret the mechanism accumulates through T steps.
Theorem 2. Let us consider a sequential auction with N advertisers, K
slots, and T steps with position–dependent cascade model with parameters
{Λm}Km=1 and accuracy η as defined in Eq. 14. For any parameter τ ∈
{1, . . . , T} and δ ∈ (0, 1), the A–VCG1 achieves auctioneer’s revenue ex-
pected regret:
RT ≤ vmax
( K∑
m=1
Λm
)(
2(T − τ)η + τ + δT
)
. (19)
By setting the parameters to
• δ = K− 13T− 13N 13
• τ = K− 13T 23N 13Λ−
2
3
min
[
log
(
K
1
3T
1
3N
2
3
)] 1
3
,
where Λmin = min
m∈K
Λm > 0, then the regret is
RT ≤ 4vmaxΛ−
2
3
minK
2
3T
2
3N
1
3
[
log
(
K
1
3T
1
3N
2
3
)] 13
. (20)
We initially introduce some remarks about the above results, and subse-
quently discuss the proof of the theorem, which can be found in the appendix.
Remark 1 (The bound). Up to numerical constants and logarithmic
factors, the bound in Eq. 20 is RT = O˜(K
2
3T
2
3N
1
3 ). We first notice that A–
VCG1 is a no–regret algorithm since its per–step regret (RT/T ) decreases to
0 as T−
1
3 , thus implying that it asymptotically achieves the same performance
as the VCG. Furthermore, we notice that for K = 1 the bound reduces (up
to constants) to the single–slot case analyzed in [20]. Unlike the standard
bound for MAB algorithms, the regret scales as O˜(T
2
3 ) instead of O˜(T
1
2 ). As
pointed out in [20] and [21] this is the unavoidable price the bandit algorithm
has to pay to be DSIC a posteriori w.r.t. the realizations of the random
component of a mechanism. Finally, the dependence of the regret on N
is sub–linear (N
1
3 ) and therefore increasing the number of advertisers does
not significantly worsen the regret. The dependency on the number of slots
K is similar: according to the bound in Eq. 20 the regret has a sublinear
dependency O˜(K
2
3 ), meaning that whenever one slot is added to the auction,
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the performance of the algorithm does not significantly worsen. By analyzing
the difference between the payments of the VCG and A–VCG1, we notice
that during the exploration phase the regret is O(τK) (e.g., if all the ads
allocated into the K slots are clicked at each explorative step), while during
the exploitation phase the error in estimating the qualities sum over all the
K slots, thus suggesting a linear dependency on K for this phase as well.
Nonetheless, asK increases, the number of samples available per–ad increases
as τK/N , thus improving the accuracy of the quality estimates by O˜(K−
1
2 )
(see Proposition 1). As a result, as K increases, the exploration phase can
be shortened (the optimal τ actually decreases as K−
1
3 ), thus reducing the
regret during the exploration, and still have accurate enough estimates to
control the regret of the exploitation phase.
Remark 2 (Distribution–free bound). The bound derived in Theo-
rem 2 is a distribution–free (or worst–case) bound, since it holds for any set
of advertisers (i.e., for any {qi}i∈N and {vi}i∈N ). This generality comes at
the price that, as illustrated in other remarks and in the numerical simula-
tions (see Section 6), the bound could be inaccurate for some specific sets of
advertisers. On the other hand, distribution–dependent bounds (see e.g., the
bounds of UCB [42]), where q and v appear explicitly, would be more accu-
rate in predicting the behavior of the algorithm. Nonetheless, they could not
be used to optimize the parameters δ and τ , since they would then depend
on unknown quantities.
Remark 3 (Parameters). The choice of parameters τ and δ reported
in Theorem 2 is obtained by a rough minimization of the upper–bound in
Eq. 19. Each parameter can be computed by knowing the characteristics of
the auction (number of steps T , number of slots K, number of ads N , and
Λm). Moreover, since the values are obtained optimizing an upper–bound
of the regret and not directly the true cumulative regret, these values can
provide a good guess for the parametrization, but they might not be optimal.
In practice, we expect that the regret could be optimized by searching the
space of the parameters around the values suggested in Theorem 2.
Remark 4 (DSIC in expectation). In this paper, we do not solve two
interesting problems when DSIC in expectation w.r.t. the realizations of the
random component of the mechanism is adopted: (i) whether it is possible
or not to avoid the separation of the exploration and exploitation phases
and (ii) whether it is possible to obtain a regret of O˜(T
1
2 ) as in the case of
K = 1 [23]. Any attempt we tried to extend the result presented in [23]
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to the multi–slot case led to a non–IC mechanism. We briefly provide some
examples of adaptation to our framework of the two MAB presented in [23].
None of these attempts provided a monotonic allocation function. We tried to
extend the UCB1 in different ways, e.g., by introducing N ·K estimators, one
for each ad for each slot, or maintaining N estimators weighing in different
ways clicks obtained in different slots. The second MAB algorithm, called
NewCB, is based on the definition of a set of active ads, i.e., the ones that
can be displayed in the unique slot. We considered some extensions for the
multi–slot setting (e.g. a single set for all the slots and multiple sets, one for
each slot) without identifying monotonic allocation algorithms.
Comments to the proof. The proof uses relatively standard arguments
to bound the regret of the exploitation phase. As discussed in Remark 2,
the bound is distribution–free and some steps in the proof are conservative
upper–bounds on quantities that might be smaller for specific auctions. For
instance, the inverse dependency on the smallest cumulative discount factor
Λmin in the final bound could be a quite inaccurate upper–bound on the
quantity
∑K
m=1 1/Λ
2
m. In fact, the parameter τ itself could be optimized as
a direct function of
∑K
m=1 1/Λ
2
m, thus obtaining a more accurate tuning of
the length of the exploration phase and a slightly tighter bound (in terms of
constant terms). Furthermore, a crucial step in the proof is the inequality
max
i∈N
(q˜+i vi;h)/max
i∈N
(q˜+i vi;m) ≤ 1, which is likely to become less accurate as
the difference between h and m increases (see Eq. C.4 in the proof). For
instance, if the qualities qi are drawn from a uniform distribution in (0, 1), as
the number of slots increases this quantity reduces as well (on average), thus
making the upper–bound by 1 less and less accurate. The accuracy of the
proof and the corresponding bound are further studied in the simulations in
Section 6.
Besides a bound on the revenue regret, in a similar way we can bound
the SW, as in [23]. In particular, we obtain that A–VCG1 is a no–regret
algorithm and RSWT = O˜(T
2
3 ).
Theorem 3. Let us consider a sequential auction with N advertisers, K
slots, and T steps with position–dependent cascade model with parameters
{Λm}Km=1 and accuracy η as defined in Eq. 14. For any parameter τ ∈
{1, . . . , T} and δ ∈ (0, 1), the A–VCG1 achieves a SW regret:
RSWT ≤ vmaxK (2 (T − τ) η + τ + δT ) . (21)
By setting the parameters to
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• δ =
(
1
Λmin
) 2
3
K−
1
3T−
1
3N
1
3
• τ =
(
1
Λmin
) 2
3
K−
1
3T
2
3N
1
3
(
log 2Λ
2
3
minK
1
3T
1
3N
2
3
) 1
3
,
where Λmin = min
m∈K
Λm, Λmin > 0, then the regret is
RSWT ≤ 4vmax
(
1
Λmin
) 2
3
K
2
3T
2
3N
1
3
(
log 2Λ
2
3
minK
1
3T
1
3N
2
3
) 1
3
. (22)
Notice that using τ and δ defined in Theorem 2, the bound for RSWT is
O˜(T
2
3 ), even if the parameters are not optimal for this second framework.
4.2. Unknown {Λm}m∈K
We now focus on the situation when the auctioneer knows {qi}i∈N , while
{Λm}m∈K are unknown. By definition of cascade model, {Λm}m∈K are strictly
non–increasing in m. This dramatically simplifies the allocation problem
since the optimal allocation can be found without knowing the actual values
of {Λm}m∈K. Indeed, the allocation θ∗ such that α(m; θ∗) ∈ arg max
i∈N
(qivˆi;m),∀m,
is optimal for any possible {Λm}m∈K. However, the lack of knowledge about
{Λm}m∈K makes the design of a truthful mechanism non trivial because the
cumulative probabilities of observation appear in the calculation of the pay-
ments. In the following, we initially focus on DSIC in expectation mecha-
nisms, providing two mechanisms, the first DSIC in expectation w.r.t. the
click realizations and the second DSIC in expectation w.r.t. the realizations
of the random component of the mechanism, and finally we discuss about
DSIC a posteriori mechanisms.
4.2.1. DSIC in expectation w.r.t. the click realizations mechanism
In this case, we do not need to estimate the parameters {Λm}m∈K and
therefore we do not resort to the MAB framework to solve any exploration-
exploitation dilemma. The pseudocode of the algorithm A–VCG2 (Adaptive
VCG2) is given in Fig. 2. On the basis of the above considerations, we
can adopt the allocatively efficient allocation function f ∗ as prescribed by
Eq. 8 even if the mechanism does not know the actual values of the param-
eters {Λm}m∈K. Nonetheless, the VCG payments defined in Eq. 9 cannot be
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Input: Qualities parameters {qi}i∈N
for t = 1, . . . , T do
Allocate ads according to f∗ as prescribed by (8)
if Ad ai is displayed then
Ask for payment pci defined in (23)
Figure 2: Pseudo–code for the A–VCG2 mechanism.
computed, since {Λm}m∈K are unknown. However, by resorting to execution–
contingent payments (generalizing the pay–per–click approach), we can im-
pose computable payments that, in expectation, are equal to Eq. 9.14 More
precisely, the contingent payments are computed given the bids vˆ and all
click events over the slots and take the form:
pci
(
vˆ, {clickα(m;θ∗)m }Km=1
)
(23)
=
∑
pi(i;θ∗)≤m≤K
clickα(m;θ
∗)
m ·
qα(m;θ∗−i) · vˆα(m;θ∗−i)
qα(m;θ∗)
−
∑
pi(i;θ∗)<m≤K
clickα(m;θ
∗)
m · vˆα(m;θ∗)
Notice that the payment pci depends not only on the click of ad ai, but also
on the clicks of all the ads displayed below ai. In expectation, the two terms
of pci are:
Eclick
 ∑
pi(i;θ∗)≤m≤K
clickα(m;θ
∗)
m ·
qα(m;θ∗−i) · vˆα(m;θ∗−i)
qα(m;θ∗)
 = ∑
pi(j;θ∗)≥pi(i;θ∗)
Λpi(j;θ∗−i)qj vˆj
Eclick
 ∑
pi(i;θ∗)<m≤K
clickα(m;θ
∗)
m · vˆα(m;θ∗)
 = ∑
pi(j;θ∗)>pi(i;θ∗)
Λpi(j;θ∗)qj vˆj
and therefore, in expectation, the payment equals those defined in Eq. 9. We
discuss the properties of the mechanism in what follows.
Proposition 2. The A–VCG2 is IR a posteriori.
14In pay–per–click payments, an advertiser pays only once its ad is clicked; in our
execution–contingent payments, an advertiser pays also when the ads of other advertisers
are clicked.
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Proof. Rename the ads {a1, . . . , aN} such that q1v1 ≥ q2v2 ≥ . . . ≥ qNvN .
We can write payments in Eq. 23 as:
pci
(
v, {clickjj}Kj=1
)
=
K∑
j=i
clickjj
qj
qj+1vj+1 −
K∑
j=i+1
clickjjvj
Thus, the utility for advertiser ai is:
ui = click
j
jvi +
K∑
j=i+1
clickjjvj −
K∑
j=i
clickjj
qj
qj+1vj+1
=
K∑
j=i
clickjjvj −
K∑
j=i
clickjj
qj
qj+1vj+1
=
K∑
j=i
(
clickjjvj −
clickjj
qj
qj+1vj+1
)
=
K∑
j=i
clickjj
qj
(qjvj − qj+1vj+1).
Since
clickjj
qj
≥ 0 by definition and qjvj − qj+1vj+1 ≥ 0 because of the chosen
ordering of the ads, then the utility is always positive and we can conclude
that the mechanism is IR a posteriori. 
Theorem 4. The A–VCG2 is:
• DSIC in expectation w.r.t. the click realizations,
• IR a posteriori,
• WBB in expectation w.r.t. the click realizations,
• AE.
Proof. It trivially follows from the fact that the allocation function is AE
and the payments in expectation equal the VCG ones and by Proposition 2.

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Proposition 3. The A–VCG2 is not DSIC a posteriori (w.r.t. the click re-
alizations).
Proof. The proof is by counterexample. Consider an environment with 3
ads N = {1, 2, 3} and 2 slots S = {1, 2} s.t. q1 = 0.5, v1 = 4, q2 = 1, v2 = 1,
q3 = 1, v3 = 0.5, which correspond to expected values of 2, 1, and 0.5.
The optimal allocation θ∗ consists in allocating a1 in s1 and a2 in s2.
Consider a step t when both ad a1 and a2 are clicked, from Eq. 23 we have
that the payment of a2 is:
pc2
(
v, {clickα(m;θ∗)m }Km=1
)
=
1
q2
q3v3 = 0.5
If ad a2 reports a value vˆ2 = 3, the optimal allocation is now a2 in s1 e a1 in
s2. In the case both a1 and a2 are clicked, the payment of a2 is:
pc2
(
vˆ, {clickα(m;θ∗)m }Kj=1
)
=
1
q2
q1v1 +
1
q1
q3v3 − v1 = 2 + 1− 4 = −1
Given that, in both cases, the utility is u2 = v2 − pc2
(
vˆ, {clickα(m;θ∗)m }Km=1
)
,
reporting a non–truthful value is optimal. Thus, we can conclude that the
mechanism is not DSIC a posteriori w.r.t. the click realizations. .
Proposition 4. The A–VCG2 is not WBB a posteriori (w.r.t. the click re-
alizations).
Proof. The proof is by counterexample. Consider an environment with 3
ads N = {1, 2, 3} and 2 slots S = {1, 2} s.t. q1 = 1, v1 = 2, q2 = 0.5, v2 = 1,
q3 = 1, v3 = 0.1.
The optimal allocation θ∗ consists in allocating a1 in s1 e a2 in s2. Con-
sider step t when both ad a1 and a2 are clicked, their payments are:
pc1
(
v, {clickα(m;θ∗)m }Km=1
)
=
1
q1
q2v2+
1
q2
q3v3−v2 = 0.5+2·0.1−1 = 0.2−0.5 < 0
pc2 =
1
q2
q3v3 = 0.2
Thus,
∑3
i=1 p
c
i
(
v, {clickα(m;θ∗)m }Km=1
)
= 0.4−0.5 < 0, and we can conclude
that the mechanism is not WBB a posteriori. 
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Input: Qualities parameters {qi}i∈N
for t = 1, . . . , T do
Allocate ads according to f∗′ as prescribed by Algorithm 1
For each ad ai, ask for payment p
B,∗,c
i defined in (25)
Figure 3: Pseudo–code for the A–VCG2′ mechanism.
Now we state the following theorem, whose proof is straightforward.
Theorem 5. Let us consider a sequential auction with N advertisers, K
slots, and T steps, with position–dependent cascade model with parameters
{Λm}Km=1. The A–VCG2 achieves an auctioneer’s revenue expected regret
RT = 0.
An important property of this mechanism is that the expected payments are
exactly the VCG payments for the optimal allocation when all the parameters
are known. Moreover, the absence of an exploration phase allows us to obtain
a per–step expected regret of zero and, thus, the cumulative regret over the
T steps of auction is RT = 0. Similar considerations can be applied to the
study of the regret over the SW, obtaining the following.
Corollary 1. Let us consider a sequential auction with N advertisers, K
slots, and T steps, with position–dependent cascade model with parameters
{Λm}Km=1. The A–VCG2 achieves an SW regret RSWT = 0.
4.2.2. DSIC in expectation w.r.t. the realizations of the random component
mechanisms
As for the previous mechanism, also in this case we only need an ex-
ploitation phase. Unlike A–VCG2, in this case we need to follow a similar
approach as in [23] and introduce a random component, which leads to the
mechanism, called A–VCG2′ reported in Fig. 3.
Since f ∗ is monotonic (see Appendix B) and the problem is with single
parameter and linear utilities, payments that guarantee DSIC in expectation
w.r.t. the click realizations can be written as Myerson payments:
p∗i (vˆ) = Λpi(i;f∗(vˆ))qivˆi −
∫ vˆi
0
Λpi(i;f∗(vˆ−i,u))qidu, (24)
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which coincide with the VCG payments defined in Eq. 3 (hence the use of
the same notation p∗i ). This is justified by the fact that when a mechanism is
AE, IR in expectation w.r.t. the click realizations and WBB in expectation
w.r.t. the click realizations the only payments that lead to a DSIC in expec-
tation w.r.t. the click realizations mechanism are the VCG payments with
Clacke’s pivot [45], and thus Eq. 24 coincides with Eq. 3. However, these
payments are not directly computable, since the parameters {Λm}m∈K in the
integral are unknown and, as in the case discussed in Section 4.2.1, we can-
not replace them by empirical estimates. Nonetheless, we could obtain these
payments in expectation by using execution–contingent payments associated
with non–optimal allocations where the report vˆi is randomly modified in an
interval between 0 and the actual value. This can be obtained by resorting
to the approach proposed in [23], which takes as input a generic allocation
function f and introduces a randomized component to it, thus producing a
new (random) allocation function that we denote by f ′. At the cost of reduc-
ing the efficiency of the mechanism, this technique allows the computation
of the allocation and the payments at the same time, even when payments
described in [35] cannot be directly computed.
In A–VCG2′, we apply this approach to f ∗, thus obtaining a new al-
location function f ∗
′
. With f ∗
′
, the advertisers’ reported values {vˆi}i∈N
are modified, each with a (small) probability µ ∈ (0, 1). The (potentially)
modified values are then used to compute the allocation (using f ∗) and the
payments. More precisely, with a probability of (1 − µ)N , f ∗′ returns the
same allocation as f ∗, while it defines a different allocation with probability
of 1−(1−µ)N . The reported values {vˆi}i∈N are modified through the canon-
ical Self–Resampling Procedure (cSRP) described in [23] that generates two
samples: xi(vˆi, ωi) and yi(vˆi, ωi), where ωi is the random seed. We sketch the
result of cSRP where the function ‘rec’ is defined in [23]:
(xi, yi) = cSRP (vˆi) =
{
(vˆi, vˆi) w.p. 1− µ
(vˆ′′i , vˆ
′
i) otherwise
,
where vˆ′i ∼ U([0, vˆi]) and vˆ′′i = rec(vˆ′i). The algorithm in Fig. 4 shows how
f ∗
′
works when the original allocation function is f ∗. The reported values
{vˆi}i∈N are perturbed through the cSRP (Step 2) and then the allocation is
chosen by applying the original allocation function f ∗ to the new values x
(Step 4). Finally, the payments are computed as
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for all ai, i ∈ N do
(xi, yi) = cSRP (vˆi)
x = (x1, . . . , xN )
θ = f∗(x)
Figure 4: Definition of f∗
′
(vˆ).
pB,∗,ci (x, click
i
pi(i;f∗(x))) =
{
pB,∗i (x,y;vˆ)
Λpi(i;f∗(x))qi
if clickipi(i;f∗(x)) = 1
0 otherwise
=
vˆi −
{
1
µ
vˆi if yi < vˆi
0 otherwise,
if clickipi(i;f∗(x)) = 1
0 otherwise
(25)
where
pB,∗i (x,y; vˆ) = Λpi(i;f∗(x))qivˆi −
{
1
µ
Λpi(i;f∗(x))qivˆi if yi < vˆi
0 otherwise
, (26)
with y = (y1, . . . , yN). If we take the expectation of the payments in Eq. 25
w.r.t. the randomization of the mechanism, then we obtain exactly the same
form of payments as in Eq. 24 but instantiated for the randomized allocation
function f ∗
′
(for the explicit equation refer to Eq. E.1 in Appendix E). Fur-
thermore, the resulting mechanism is shown to be DSIC in expectation w.r.t.
the realizations of the random component of the mechanism and a posteriori
w.r.t. the click realizations. As a result we obtained the following properties.
Theorem 6. The A–VCG2 ′ is:
• DSIC in expectation w.r.t. the realizations of the random component of
the mechanism and a posteriori w.r.t. the click realizations,
• IR a posteriori,
• WBB in expectation w.r.t. the realizations of the random component of
the mechanism and a posteriori w.r.t. the click realizations.
We also obtain the following regret guarantees.
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Theorem 7. Let us consider an auction with N advertisers, K slots, and T
steps, with position–dependent cascade model with parameters {Λm}Km=1. The
A–VCG2 ′ achieves an auctioneer’s revenue expected regret RT ≤ 2K2µvmaxT .
If we tune the randomization parameter as µ = 1
K2T
, then we obtain
RT = O(1). Notice that µ cannot be just set to zero, since it would lead
to a division by zero in Eq. 25. Furthermore, as illustrated in Section 6, an
undesirable effect of a small µ is the corresponding increase in the variance
in the payments. Thus a proper trade-off should be found when tuning µ in
practice. We provide a similar result for the regret over the SW.
Theorem 8. Let us consider a sequential auction with N advertisers, K
slots, and T steps, with position–dependent cascade model with parameters
{Λm}Km=1. The A–VCG2 ′ achieves a SW regret RSWT ≤ K2µvmaxT .
4.2.3. Discussion about DSIC a posteriori mechanisms
One may wonder whether there exists a no–regret DSIC a posteriori
mechanism, even at the cost of a worse regret. Resorting to the same ar-
guments used in [28], we show that the answer to such question is negative.
Theorem 9. Let us consider a sequential auction with N advertisers, K
slots, and T steps, with position–dependent cascade model with parameters
{Λm}Km=1 whose value are unknown. Any online learning mechanism that
is DSIC a posteriori achieves an auctioneer’s revenue expected regret RT of
Θ(T ).
Proof. (sketch) Basically, the A–VCG2 mechanism is DSIC in expectation
w.r.t. the click realizations because it adopts execution–contingent payments
in which the payment of advertiser ai depends also on the clicks over ads other
than ai, while A–VCG2
′ is DSIC in expectation w.r.t. the realization of the
random component of the mechanism because it adopts implicit payments. In
order to have DSIC a posteriori, we need payments pi that are deterministic
w.r.t. the click realizations over other ads other than ai (i.e., pay–per–click
payments are needed) and deterministic w.r.t. any realization of the random
component of the mechanism.
We notice that even if {Λm}m∈K have been estimated (e.g., in an exploit-
ation phase), we cannot have payments leading to DSIC a posteriori. Indeed,
with estimates {Λ˜m}m∈K, the allocation function maximizing S˜W (computed
39
with Λ˜m) is not an affine maximizer and therefore the adoption of WVCG
mechanism would not guarantee DSIC, not even in expectation. As a result,
only mechanisms with payments defined in Eq. 24 can be used. However,
these payments, if computed exactly (and not estimated in expectation), as
required to have DSIC a posteriori, require the knowledge about the actual
Λm related to each slot sm in which an ad can be allocated for each report
vˆ ≤ v.
To prove the theorem, we provide a characterization of DSIC a posteriori
mechanisms. More precisely, we need a monotonic allocation function and
the payments defined in Eq. 24. As mentioned above, these payments require
the knowledge about the actual Λm related to the slot sm in which an ad can
be allocated for any report vˆ ≤ v. Thus we have two possibilities:
• In the first case, the ads are partitioned and each partition is associ-
ated with a single slot and the ad with the largest expected valuation
is chosen at each slot independently. In other words, an ad can be
allocated only in one given specific slot and its report determines only
whether it is displayed or not (and not where). This case is equivalent
to multiple separate–single slot auctions and therefore each auction is
DSIC a posteriori as shown in [20]. However, as shown in [28], this
mechanism would have a regret Θ(T ).
• In the second case, the ads are partitioned and each partition is associ-
ated with multiple slots and for each partition an auction is carried out
to determine the allocation over each slot. In other words, an ad can
be allocated in one of a given set of slots (associated with its partition)
on the basis of its report. In this case, to compute the payments, it
would be necessary to know the exact CTR of the ad for each possible
slot, but this is possible only in expectation either by using the above
execution–contingent, as we do in Section 4.2.1, or by using a random
component in the mechanism, as we do in Section 4.2.2. However, in
both these case we would not obtain DSIC a posteriori.
Thus, in order to have DSIC a posteriori, we need to adopt the class of
mechanisms described in the first case, obtaining RT = Θ(T ). 
4.3. Unknown {Λm}m∈K and {qi}i∈N
In this section we study the situation in which both {qi}i∈N and {Λm}m∈K
are unknown. From the results derived in the previous section, we know that
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Input: Length of exploration phase τ , confidence δ
Exploration phase
for t = 1, . . . , τ do
Allocate ads according to (13)
Ask for no payment
Observe the clicks {clicki1(t)}Ni=1
Compute the estimated quality q˜i =
1
|Bi|
∑
t∈Bi click
i
1(t)
Compute q˜+i = q˜i + η where η is given by (27)
Exploitation phase
for t = τ + 1, . . . , T do
Allocate ads according to f˜ ′ as prescribed by Algorithm 1 adopting f˜ instead
of f∗
For each ad ai, ask for payment p˜
B,c
i defined in (28)
Figure 5: Pseudo–code for the A–VCG3 mechanism.
adopting DSIC a posteriori leads to RT = Θ(T ). Thus, we will only focus
on DSIC in expectation.
First of all, we remark that the mechanisms presented in Section 4.1
and 4.2 cannot be adopted here and a new mechanism is needed. By com-
bining A–VCG1 and A–VCG2′, we obtain the algorithm A–VCG3 (Adaptive
VCG3) illustrated in Fig. 5. As in the case when only the qualities {qi}i∈N
are unknown, we formalize the problem as a MAB where the exploration and
exploitation phases are separate and where, during the exploration phase, we
estimate the values of {qi}i∈N .
Exploration phase. During the first τ steps, estimates of {qi}i∈N are com-
puted. We use the same exploration policy of Section 4.1, but the estimates
are computed just using samples from the first slot, since Λm with m > 1
are unknown.15 Define Bi = {t : pi(i; θt) = 1, 1 ≤ t ≤ τ} the set of steps
15In the following, we report some considerations about the case in which also the
samples from the slots below the first are considered. Let us observe that, even if we use
only the samples from the first slot, the algorithms [20, 21] that apply to the single–slot
case cannot be adopted here unless to accept a regret Θ(T ). This is essentially due to the
fact that algorithms [20, 21] have deterministic payments, but, as we show in Section 4.2.3,
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where ai is displayed in the first slot, the number of samples collected for ai
is |Bi| = b τN c ≥ τ2N .16 The estimated value of qi is:
q˜i =
1
|Bi|
∑
t∈Bi
clicki1(t).
such that q˜i is an unbiased estimate of qi (i.e., Eclick[q˜i] = qi). By applying
the Hoeffding’s inequality we obtain an upper bound over the error of the
estimated quality q˜i for each ad ai.
Proposition 5. For any ad {ai}i∈N
|qi − q˜i| ≤
√
1
2|Bi| log
2N
δ
≤
√
N
τ
log
2N
δ
=: η, (27)
with probability 1− δ (w.r.t. the click realizations).
In this case, in order to have a meaningful bound, i.e., |qi− q˜i| < 1, the length
of the exploration phase has to be τ > N log 2N
δ
. After the exploration phase,
an upper–confidence bound over each quality is computed as q˜+i = q˜i + η.
Exploitation phase. We first focus on the allocation function. During
the exploitation phase we want to use an allocation θ˜ = f˜(vˆ) maximizing
the estimated SW with estimated {q˜+i }i∈N and the parameters {Λm}m∈K.
Since the actual parameters {Λm}m∈K are monotonically non–increasing, θ˜
is defined as an allocation {〈sm, aα(m;θ˜)〉}m∈K′ , where
α(m; θ˜) ∈ arg max
i∈N
(q˜+i vˆi;m) = arg max
i∈N
(q˜+i Λmvˆi;m).
We now focus on payments. Allocation function f˜ is an affine maximizer
(due to weights depending on q˜i as in Section 4.1), but WVCG payments
cannot be computed given that parameters {Λm}m∈K are unknown. Neither
the adoption of execution–contingent payments, like in Eq. 23, is allowed,
we cannot have no–regret mechanisms when payments are deterministic.
16Following the same reasoning of Section 4.1, we consider an exploration time of τ >
2N , which guarantees to have at least two samples to estimate each q˜+i .
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given that qi is unknown and only estimates q˜i are available. Thus, we resort
to implicit payments as in Section 4.2.2. More precisely, we use the same
exploitation phase adopted in Section 4.2.2, except that we use f˜ in place of
f ∗. In this case, we have that the per–click payments are:
p˜B,ci (x, click
i
pi(i;f˜(x))
) =
{
p˜Bi (x,y;vˆ)
Λpi(i;f˜(x))qi
if clicki
pi(i;f˜(x))
= 1
0 otherwise
=
=
vˆi −
{
1
µ
vˆi if yi < vˆi
0 otherwise
if clicki
pi(i;f˜(x))
= 1
0 otherwise
(28)
where
p˜Bi (x,y; vˆ) = Λpi(i;f˜(x))qivˆi −
{
1
µ
Λpi(i;f˜(x))qivˆi if yi < vˆi
0 otherwise
. (29)
We can state the following.
Theorem 10. The A–VCG3 is:
• DSIC in expectation w.r.t. the realizations of the random component of
the mechanism and a posteriori w.r.t. the click realizations,
• IR a posteriori,
• WBB in expectation w.r.t. the realizations of the random component of
the mechanism and a posteriori w.r.t. the click realizations.
Proof. The proof of DSIC in expectation and WBB in expectation easily
follows from the definition of the adopted mechanism as discussed in [23].
The proof of IR a posteriori is similar to the proof of Proposition 2. The
fact that the properties hold a posteriori w.r.t. the click realizations follows
from [23]. 
Now we want to analyze the performance of the mechanism in terms of
the regret accumulated through T steps. Notice that in this case we have
to focus on two different potential sources of regret: the adoption of a sub–
optimal (randomized) allocation function and the estimation of the unknown
parameters.
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Theorem 11. Let us consider a sequential auction with N advertisers, K
slots, and T steps, with position–dependent cascade model with parameters
{Λm}Km=1, accuracy η as defined in Eq. 27 and parameter µ ∈ (0, 1]. For
any parameter τ ∈ {1, . . . , T} and δ ∈ (0, 1), the A–VCG3 achieves an
auctioneer’s revenue expected regret:
RT ≤ vmaxK [(T − τ) (2η + 2µN) + τ + δT ] .
By setting the parameters to
• µ = T− 13N− 23 ,
• δ = T− 13N 13 ,
• τ = T 23N 13 (log 2N
δ
) 1
3 ,
then the regret is
RT ≤ 6vmaxKT 23N 13
(
log
(
2T
1
3N
2
3
)) 13
. (30)
Remark 1 (The bound). Up to numerical constants and logarithmic
factors, the previous bound on RT = O˜(T
2
3KN
1
3 ). We first notice that also
in this case we match the lowest possible regret w.r.t. T when exploration
and exploitation phases are separate. As a result, the proposed mechanism
is a no–regret algorithm and it asymptotically approaches the performance
of the VCG (when all the parameter are known). Compared to the results
in Section 4.1, the dependency of the regret on K increased by a factor K
1
3
and it is now linear. This is a direct consequence of the exploration phase.
In fact, here we cannot take advantage of the samples collected over all the
slots, and the qualities are estimated only using samples observed in the first
slot. On the other hand, the dependency on N is the same as in Section 4.1.
Remark 2 (Non–separate phases and O˜(T
1
2 )). The questions whether
it is possible to avoid separating exploration and exploitation and preserve
DSIC in expectation (in some form) and whether it is possible to obtain a
regret of O˜(T
1
2 ) are open.
Remark 3 (Using samples from multiple slots). An important
issue is whether it is possible to exploit samples from the slots below the first
one to improve the accuracy of the estimates and reduce the length of the
exploration phase. The critical issue here is that the samples from slots below
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the first are drawn from a Bernoulli distribution with parameter obtained by
the product of Λm and qi, and it is not trivial to find a method to use these
samples to improve the estimates. However, we notice that the exploitation
of these additional samples would correspond to a reduction of the regret
bound of at most K
1
3 , given that the dependency from K cannot be better
than in the case discussed in Section 4.1 (i.e., O(K
2
3 )).
We can also prove an upper–bound for the regret for the SW of A–VCG3.
Theorem 12. Let us consider an auction with N advertisers, K slots, and
T steps, with position–dependent cascade model with parameters {Λm}Km=1,
accuracy η as defined in Eq. 27 and parameter µ ∈ (0, 1]. For any parameter
τ ∈ {1, . . . , T} and δ ∈ (0, 1), the A–VCG3 achieves a SW regret:
RSWT ≤ vmaxK [(T − τ)(2η +Nµ) + τ + δT ] .
By setting the parameters to
• µ = K−1T− 13N 13 ,
• δ = T− 13N 13 ,
• τ = T 23N 13 (log 2N
δ
) 1
3 ,
then the regret is
RSWT ≤ 5vmaxKT
2
3N
1
3
(
log 2T
1
3N
2
3
) 1
3
.
Also in this case we obtain a regret on the SW RSWT = O˜(T
2
3 ).
5. Learning with Position– and Ad–Dependent Externalities
In this section we deal with the general model in Eq. 1, where both
position– and ad–dependent externalities are present and we provide several
partial results. In Section 5.1, we analyze the problem of designing a DSIC a
posteriori mechanism when only the qualities of the ads are unknown, while
in Section 5.2 we highlight some problems that rise when also continuation
probabilities are uncertain.
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Input: Length of exploration phase τ , confidence δ, position–dependent pa-
rameters {Γm}m∈K
Exploration phase
for t = 1, . . . , τ do
Allocate ads according to (13)
Ask for no payment
Observe the clicks {clickipi(i;θt)(t)}Ni=1
Compute the estimated quality q˜i =
1
|Bi|
∑
t∈Bi
clicki
pi(i;θt)
(t)
Γpi(i;θt)(θt)
Compute q˜+i = q˜i + η where η is given by (31)
Exploitation phase
for t = τ + 1, . . . , T do
Allocate ads according to f˜
if Ad ai is clicked then
Ask for payment p˜ci defined in (32)
Figure 6: Pseudo–code for the A–VCG4 mechanism.
5.1. Unknown qualities {qi}i∈N
We first focus on the problem where the only unknown parameters are
the qualities {qi}i∈N of the ads and the externality model includes position–
and ad–dependent externalities. We focus on DSIC in expectation w.r.t. the
click realizations, since there is not any no–regret mechanism that is DSIC
a posteriori w.r.t. the click realizations [43], and we study MAB algorithms
that separate the exploration and exploitation phases. The structure of the
mechanism we propose, called A–VCG4, is similar to the A–VCG1 and is
reported in Fig. 6.
Exploration phase. At each step of the exploration phase of length τ , we
collect K samples of no–click/click events. Given a generic exploration policy
{θt}τt=1, the estimated quality q˜i is computed as:
q˜i =
1
|Bi|
∑
t∈Bi
clickipi(i;θt)(t)
Γpi(i;θt)(θt)
,
where Bi = {t : pi(i; θt) ≤ K, 1 ≤ t ≤ τ}. Since the explorative allocations
θt impact on the cumulative probabilities of observation Γm(θt), we use a
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variation of Proposition 1 in which Eq. 12 is replaced by:
|qi − q˜i| ≤
√√√√(∑
t∈Bi
1
Γpi(i;θt)(θt)
2
)
1
2|Bi|2 log
2N
δ
.
For each exploration policy such that |Bi| = bKτ/Nc ≥ Kτ2N for any i ∈ N
(e.g., the policy defined in Eq. 13), we redefine η as
|qi − q˜i| ≤ 1
Γmin
√
N
Kτ
log
2N
δ
=: η, (31)
where Γmin = min
θ∈Θ,m∈K
{Γm(θ)}. In this case, in order to have a meaningful
bound, i.e., |qi − q˜i| < 1, the length of the exploration phase has to be
τ > 1
Γ2min
N
K
log 2N
δ
. We define the upper–confidence bound q˜+i = q˜i + η.
During the exploration phase, in order to preserve the DSIC a posteriori
property, the allocations {θt}τt=1 do not depend on the reported values of the
advertisers and no payments are imposed to the advertisers.
Exploitation phase. We define an upper bound on the SW as
S˜W(θ, vˆ) =
N∑
i=1
Γpi(i;θ)(θ)q˜
+
i vˆi =
K∑
m=1
Γm(θ)q˜
+
α(m;θ)vˆα(m;θ).
We denote by θ˜ the allocation maximizing S˜W(f(vˆ), vˆ) and by f˜ the alloca-
tion function returning θ˜:
θ˜ = f˜(vˆ) ∈ arg max
θ∈Θ
S˜W(θ, vˆ).
Once the exploration phase is over, the ads are allocated on the basis
of f˜ . Since f˜ is an affine maximizer, the mechanism can impose WVCG
payments to the advertisers satisfying the DSIC a posteriori property. In a
pay–per–click fashion the advertiser ai is charged
p˜ci(vˆ, click
i
pi(i;θ˜)
) =
S˜W(θ˜−i)− S˜W−i(θ˜)
Γpi(i;θ˜)(θ˜)q˜
+
i
clicki
pi(i;θ˜)
, (32)
which corresponds, in expectation, to the WVCG payment E
[
p˜ci(vˆ, click
i
pi(i;θ˜)
)
]
=
p˜i(vˆ). As a result, we have:
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Theorem 13. The A–VCG4 is:
• DSIC in expectation w.r.t. the click realizations,
• IR a posteriori,
• WBB a posteriori.
We are interested in bounding the regret of the auctioneer’s revenue due
to A–VCG4 compared to the auctioneer’s revenue of the VCG mechanism
when all the parameters are known.
Theorem 14. Let us consider a sequential auction with N advertisers, K
slots, and T steps with position/ad–dependent externalities and cumulative
discount factors {Γm(θ)}Km=1 and accuracy η defined as in Eq. 31. For any
parameter τ ∈ {1, . . . , T} and δ ∈ (0, 1), the A–VCG4 achieves an auction-
eer’s revenue expected regret:
RT ≤ vmaxK
[
10K
qmin
(T − τ)η + τ + δT
]
, (33)
where qmin = mini∈N qi. By setting the parameters to
• δ =
(
5
Γmin
) 2
3
K
1
3T−
1
3N
1
3 ,
• τ =
(
5
Γmin
) 2
3
K
1
3T
2
3N
1
3
(
log 2N
δ
) 1
3 ,
then the regret is
RT ≤ 4 · 5
2
3
Γ
2
3
minqmin
vmaxK
4
3T
2
3N
1
3
(
log
2Γ
2
3
minK
− 1
3T
1
3N
2
3
5
2
3
) 1
3
. (34)
Remark 1 (Differences w.r.t. position–dependent externalities.)
Up to constants and logarithmic factors, the previous distribution–free bound
on RT is O˜(T
2
3N
1
3K
4
3 ).17 We first notice that moving from position– to
17We notice that in [29] we provided a bound O(T
2
3NK
2
3 ) that did not match with the
numerical simulations and we conjectured a bound of O(T
2
3N
1
3K
4
3 ). Here we show the
conjecture is actually correct.
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position/ad–dependent externalities does not change the dependency of the
regret on the number of steps T and the number of ads N . Moreover, the
per–step regret still decreases to 0 as T increases. The main difference w.r.t.
the bound in Theorem 2 is in the dependency on K and on the smallest
quality qmin. We believe that the augmented dependence in K is mostly due
to an intrinsic difficulty of the position/ad–dependent externalities. As a
result, the bound displays a super–linear dependency on the number of slots.
The other main difference is that now the regret has an inverse dependency
on the smallest quality qmin. Inspecting the proof, this dependency is due to
the fact that the error of a quality estimate for an ad ai might be amplified
by the inverse of the quality itself. As discussed in Remark 2 of Theorem 2,
this dependency may also follow from the fact that we have a distribution–
free bound. Further discussion on the tightness of this bound is postponed
to Section 6.
Remark 2 (Optimization of the parameter τ). Although the actual
qualities {qi}i∈N are unknown, whenever a lower-bound on qmin is available,
the parameter τ could be better tuned by multiplying it by (qmin)
− 2
3 , thus
reducing the regret from O˜((qmin)
−1) to O˜((qmin)−
2
3 ).
Remark 3 (Externalities–dependent bound). We notice that the
previous bound does not reduce to the bound in Eq. 20 in which only
position–dependent externalities are present. Indeed, the dependency on K is
different in the two bounds: from K
2
3 in Eq. 20 to K
4
3 in Eq. 34. This means
that the bound in Eq. 34 over–estimates the dependency on K whenever the
auction has only position–dependent externalities. It is an interesting open
question whether it is possible to derive an auction–dependent bound where
the specific values of the cumulative probabilities of observation γm,i explic-
itly appear in the bound and which reduces to Eq. 20 for position–dependent
externalities.
(Comment to the proof). While the proof of Theorem 2 could exploit
the specific definition of the payments for position–dependent slots and it is
a fairly simple extension of [20], in this case the proof is more complicated
because of the dependency of the cumulative probabilities of observation on
the actual allocations and decomposes the regret of the exploitation phase in
components due to the different allocations (f˜ instead of f ∗) and the different
qualities as well (q˜+i instead of qi).
Using the mechanism described before, it is possible to derive an upper–
bound over the cumulative regret over the SW of the allocation (as in [23]).
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We obtain the same dependence over T , as for the regret on the revenue.
Theorem 15. Let us consider a sequential auction with N advertisers, K
slots, and T steps. The auction has position/ad–dependent externalities and
cumulative discount factors {Γm(θ)}Km=1 and accuracy η defined as in Eq. 31.
For any parameter τ ∈ {1, . . . , T} and δ ∈ (0, 1), the A–VCG4 achieves a
SW regret:
RSWT ≤ vmaxK [2(T − τ)η + τ + δT ] . (35)
By setting the parameters to
• δ =
(
1
Γmin
) 2
3
K−
1
3T−
1
3N
1
3 ,
• τ =
(
1
Γmin
) 2
3
K−
1
3T
2
3N
1
3
(
log 2N
δ
) 1
3 ,
then the regret is
RSWT ≤ 4vmax
(
1
Γmin
) 2
3
K
2
3T
2
3N
1
3
(
log 2Γ
− 2
3
minK
1
3T
1
3N
2
3
) 1
3
. (36)
Thus RSWT = O˜(T
2
3 ). In particular notice that A–VCG4 is a zero–regret
algorithm. We notice that unlike the bound on the revenue regret, in this
case RSWT does not display any dependency on qmin, which suggests that the
problem of minimizing the SW regret may be easier. Roughly speaking, this
is due to the fact that the accuracy of the estimated qualities is only used to
determine the allocation f˜ but they do not determine the performance of f˜
itself, which is measured according to its actual SW. On the other hand, in
the computation of the revenue regret, the qualities q˜+i are used to determine
the payments and this may lead to an additional error, which is reflected in
the presence of qmin in the bound.
5.2. Further extensions
In this section we provide a negative, in terms of regret, result under
DSIC in expectation w.r.t. the click realizations and a posteriori w.r.t. the
realization of the random component of the mechanism when the parameter
γm,i depends only on the ad ai (we denote it by ci = γm,i for any m ∈ K as
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in [24]) and this parameter is the only uncertain parameter (i.e., the qualities
are known).
We focus on the exploitation phase, supposing the exploration phase has
produced the estimates {c˜+i }i∈N for the continuation probabilities {ci}i∈N .
The allocation function f presented in [24] is able to compute the optimal
allocation when {ci}i∈N values are known, but it is not an affine maximizer
when applied to the estimated values {c˜+i }i∈N . In fact, in that case the
allocation becomes
f˜(vˆ) ∈ arg max
θ∈Θ
K∑
m=1
qα(m;θ)vˆα(m;θ)
m−1∏
h=1
c˜+α(h;θ). (37)
In this case, it is not possible to isolate a weight depending only on a single
ad and thus f˜(vˆ) is not affine. Furthermore, we can also show that such
allocation function is not monotonic.
Proposition 6. The allocation function f˜ in Eq. 37 is not monotonic.
Proof. The proof is by counterexample. Consider an environment with 3
ads and 2 slots such that
ad vi c˜
+
i ci
a1 0.85 1 0.89
a2 1 0.9 0.9
a3 1.4 0 0
and qi = 1 ∀i ∈ N . The optimal allocation θ˜ computed by f˜ when agents
declare their true values v is: ad a2 is allocated in the first slot and a3 in the
second one. We have CTRa3(θ˜) = 0.9.
If advertiser a3 reports a larger value, e.g., vˆ3 = 1.6, in the resulting
allocation f˜(vˆ3,v−3), ad a1 is displayed into the first slot and a3 into the
second one. In this case CTRa3(θˆ) = 0.89 < CTRa3(θ˜), thus the allocation
function f˜ is not monotonic. 
On the basis of this result, we can state the following theorem.
Theorem 16. Let us consider a sequential auction with N advertisers, K
slots, and T steps, with ad–dependent cascade model with parameters {ci}Ni=1
whose value are unknown. Any online learning mechanism that is DSIC in
expectation w.r.t. the click realizations and a posteriori w.r.t. the realization
of the random component of the mechanism achieves a SW regret RSWT =
Θ(T ).
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Proof. Let, with abuse of notation, f(vˆ|c) be the allocation function max-
imizing the SW given parameters c. As shown above, f(vˆ|c˜) cannot be used
in the exploitation phase, because the resulting mechanism would not be
DSIC in expectation w.r.t. the click realizations. However, it can be easily
observed that a necessary condition to have a no–regret algorithm is that
the allocation function used in the exploitation phase, say g(vˆ|c˜), is such
that g(vˆ|c) = f(vˆ|c) for every vˆ and c (that is, they always return the same
allocation). Indeed, if there exists at least a vˆ such that g(vˆ|c) 6= f(vˆ|c),
then, as T → +∞, f(vˆ|c) 6= g(vˆ|c˜), given that c˜ → c. Thus, since the dif-
ference between the values of the allocations is generically strictly positive,
the algorithm would suffer from a strictly positive regret when T → +∞
and therefore it would not be a no–regret mechanism. However, any such a
g would not be monotonic and therefore it cannot be adopted in a DSIC in
expectation w.r.t. the click realizations mechanism. As a result, any online
learning mechanism that is DSIC in expectation w.r.t. the click realizations
is not a no–regret mechanism.
To complete the proof, we need to provide a mechanism with regret Θ(T ).
Such a mechanism can be easily obtained by partitioning ads in groups such
that in each group the ads compete only for a single slot. Therefore, each ad
can appear in only one slot. 
The above result shows that no approach similar to the one described
in [23] can be adopted even for obtaining DSIC in expectation w.r.t. real-
izations of the random component of the mechanism. Indeed, the approach
described in [23] requires in input a monotonic allocation function. This
would suggest a negative result in terms of regret also with DSIC in expec-
tation w.r.t. realizations of the random component of the mechanism.
Finally, we provide a result on the regret over the auctioneer’s revenue.
The proof is straightforward given that the WVCG cannot be adopted due
to the above result and therefore the regret over the payments cannot go to
zero as T goes to infinite.
Theorem 17. Let us consider a sequential auction with N advertisers, K
slots, and T steps, with ad–dependent cascade model with parameters {ci}Ni=1
whose value are unknown. Any online learning mechanism that is DSIC in
expectation w.r.t. the click realizations and a posteriori w.r.t. realization of
the random component of the mechanism achieves an auctioneer’s revenue
expected regret RT = Θ(T ).
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6. Numerical Simulations
In this section we report numerical simulations to validate the theoreti-
cal bounds over the regret of the auctioneer’s revenue proved in the previous
sections.18 In particular, the theoretical bounds reveal the dependency of (ex-
pected) regret on characteristic parameters of the auction (i.e., T , N , K, and
qmin, and µ if the mechanism is randomized). Nonetheless, the upper bounds
may be inaccurate in overestimating the actual performance of the proposed
algorithms. In fact, while we prove that the regret can never be larger than
the upper bound, some steps in the proofs may be loose, thus leading to
bounds which do not accurately predict the behavior of the algorithms in
practice. In the following we investigate by means of numerical simulations
whether the dependency, in terms of asymptotic order, of the bounds on each
single parameter of the auction is accurate except for a numerical constant
factor. In all the following experiments, we generate the parameters related
to the ads in the same way. The qualities {qi}i∈N are drawn from a uni-
form distribution in [0.01, 0.1], while the values {vi}i∈N are randomly drawn
from a uniform distribution on [0, 1] (vmax = 1). On the other hand, the
cumulative probabilities of observation {Λm}m∈K are different case by case.
Since the main objective is to evaluate the asymptotic accuracy of the
bounds, we report the relative regret
RRT =
RT
B(T,K,N, qmin)
,
where B(T,K,N, qmin) is the value of the bound for the specific setting
(i.e., Eq. 20 and Eq. 30 for position–dependent, and Eq. 34 for position/ad–
dependent externalities).
We analyze the asymptotic accuracy of the bounds w.r.t. each specific
parameter, changing only its value and keeping the values of all the others
fixed. Since B is proved to be an upper–bound on the actual regret RT ,
we expect the relative regret RRT to be always smaller than 1 (RRT = 1
corresponds to the case in which the experimental regret perfectly matches
our upper bound). In particular, we say that our upper–bound accurately
predicts the actual asymptotic dependency of the regret w.r.t. a specific pa-
rameter if the experimental dependence of RRT w.r.t. to the parameter is a
18Since the bounds over the regret of the SW present a structure similar to those over
the auctioneer’s revenue, their empirical analysis is omitted.
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Figure 7: Position–dependent externalities with unknown {qi}i∈N . Dependency of the
relative regret on T (left) and N (right).
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Figure 8: Position–dependent externalities with unknown {qi}i∈N . Dependency of the
relative regret on K for two experimental settings (distinguished by the probability dis-
tribution according to q are drawn).
constant as the parameter changes. Notice that we do not expect the con-
stant to be close to 1, given that we focus on the asymptotic dependence
w.r.t. the parameters and in the steps of the proofs we often use worst–case
distribution–free bounds. All the results presented in the following sections
are obtained by setting τ and δ as suggested by our bounds and, where it is
not differently specified, by averaging over 100 independent runs.
6.1. Position–Dependent Externalities
6.1.1. Unknown {qi}i∈N
First of all we analyze the asymptotic accuracy of the bound provided in
Section 4.1, where the model presents only position–dependent externalities
and the qualities of the ads are unknown. We design the simulations such
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that λm = λ for every m with Λ1 = 1 and ΛK = 0.8 (i.e., λ =
K−1√0.8).
Thus, Λmin = 0.8 in all the experiments.
In Fig. 7 we analyze the asymptotic accuracy of the bound w.r.t. the
parameters T and N . All the three curves in the left plot are completely flat
(except for noise due to the randomness of the simulations) showing that the
value of the relative regret RRT for different values of K and N does not
change as T increases. This suggests that the bound in Theorem 2 effectively
predicts the dependency of the regret RT w.r.t. the number of steps T of the
auction as O˜(T 2/3). The right plot represents the dependency of the relative
regret RRT on the number of ads N . In this case we notice that it is relatively
accurate as N increases, but there is a transitory effect for smaller values of
N where the regret grows faster than predicted by the bound (although
B(T,K,N, qmin,Λmin) is still an upper–bound to RT ). Finally, the left plot
of Fig. 8 suggests that the asymptotic dependency on K in the bound of
Theorem 2 is over–estimated, since the relative regret RRT decreases as K
increases. As discussed in the comment to the proof in Section 4, this might
be explained by the over–estimation of the term
maxi(q˜
+
i vˆi;l)
maxi(q˜
+
i vˆi;k)
in the proof. In
fact, this term is likely to decrease as K increases. In order to validate this
intuition, we have identified some experimental settings for which the bound
seems to accurately predict the asymptotic dependency on K: q1 = 0.1,
q2 = 0.095, and qi = 0.09 for every 2 < i ≤ K. As a result, the ratio between
the qualities {qi}i∈N is fixed (on average) and does not change with K. The
right plot of Fig. 8 shows that, with these values of {qi}i∈N , the ratio RRT
is constant for different values of N , implying that in this case the bound
accurately predicts the asymptotic behavior of RT . In fact, as commented in
the remarks to Theorem 2, we derive distribution–independent bounds where
the qualities {qi}i∈N do not appear in the bound. As a result, RT should be
intended as a worst case w.r.t. all the possible configurations of qualities and
externalities.
6.1.2. Unknown {Λm}m∈K
We now investigate the asymptotic accuracy of the bound derived for
algorithm A–VCG2′ presented in Section 4.2.2. We used several probability
distributions to generate the values of {λm}m∈K. We observed that, when
they are drawn uniformly from the interval [0.98, 1.00], the numerical simu-
lations confirm our bound (as we show below), whereas the bound seems to
overestimate the dependencies on K and µ when the support of the proba-
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Figure 10: Position–dependent externalities with unknown {Λm}m∈K. Dependency of the
relative regret on µ (left). Variance of the revenue of the auctioneer (right).
bility distribution is wider (e.g., [ξ, 1.00] with ξ  0.98); we do not report
any plot for this second case.
The left plot of Fig. 9 shows the dependence of the ratio RRT w.r.t. T
when µ = 0.01. Despite the noise, the ratio seems not to be affected by the
variation of T , confirming our bound. In the right plot of Fig. 9, we observe
that when T = 105 and µ = 0.01 the behavior of the ratio as K changes is
essentially the same for different values of N . Furthermore, we observe that
the bound is accurate except that it seems to overestimate the dependence
when K assumes small values (as it happens in practice). In the left plot of
Fig. 10, the ratio RRT seems to be constant as µ varies when T = 10
5.
We conclude our analysis studying the variance of the payments as µ
varies. The bound over RT , provided in Section 4.2.2, suggests to choose
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a µ → 0 in order to reduce the regret. Nonetheless, the regret bounds
are obtained in expectation w.r.t. all the sources of randomization and do
not consider how single realizations of the learning mechanism may deviate
w.r.t. the expected regret. Thus in the right plot of Fig. 10 we investigate the
variance of the payments. The variance is excessively high for small values
of µ, making the adoption of these value inappropriate. Thus, the choice of
µ should consider both these two dimensions of the problem: the regret and
the variance of the payments.
6.1.3. Unknown {Λm}m∈K and {qi}i∈N
In this section we analyze the bound provided in Section 4.3 for position–
dependent auctions where both the prominences and the qualities are un-
known. For these simulations we generate {λm}m∈K samples from a uniform
distribution over [0.5, 1] and we set τ , δ and µ to the values derived for the
bound. In particular, in order to balance the increase of variance of the pay-
ments when µ decreases, the number of steps is not constant, but it changes
as a function of µ as 1000
µ
. This means that, in expectation, the bid of a
generic ad ai is modified 1000 times over the number of the steps.
In the plots of Fig. 11, we show that the bound in Eq. 30 accurately
predicts the asymptotic dependence of the regret w.r.t. the parameters T and
N . Indeed, except for the noise due to the high variance of the payments
based on the cSRP, the two plots show that fixing the other parameters, the
ratio RRT is constant as both T increases and N increases.
The plot in Fig. 12 represents the dependency of the relative regret w.r.t.
the parameter K. We can deduce that the bound RT over–estimates the
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dependency onK for small values of the parameters, while, with larger values,
the bound accurately predicts the behavior, the curves being flat.
6.2. Position/Ad–Dependent Externalities
In this section we analyze the bound provided in Section 5.1 for auc-
tions with position–dependent and ad–dependent externalities where only
the qualities are unknown.
In the bound provided in Theorem 14 the regret RT presents a linear
dependency on N and an inverse dependency on the smallest quality qmin. In
the left plot of Fig. 13 we report RRT as T increases. As it can be observed,
the bound accurately predicts the behavior of the regret w.r.t. T as in the
case of position–dependent externalities. In the right plot of Fig. 13 we report
RRT as we change qmin. According to the bound in Eq. 34 the regret should
decrease as qmin increases (i.e., RT = O˜(q
−1
min)) but it is clear from the plot
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that RT has a much smaller dependency on qmin, if any.
19 Finally, we study
the dependency on N (Fig. 14). In this case RRT slightly increases and then
it tends to flat as N increases. This result suggests that the, theoretically
derived, N
1
3 asymptotic dependency of RT w.r.t. the number of ads might
be correct. We do not report results on K since the complexity of finding
the optimal allocation f ∗ becomes intractable for values of K larger than 8,
as shown in [41], making the empirical evaluation of the bound unfeasible.
7. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we studied the problem of learning the CTRs of ads in
sponsored search auctions with truthful mechanisms. This problem is highly
challenging since it requires the combination of online learning tools (i.e.,
regret minimization algorithms) and economic tools (i.e., truthful mecha-
nisms). While almost all the literature focused on single–slot scenarios, here
we focused on multi–slot scenarios. With multiple slots it is necessary to
adopt a user model to characterize how the CTR of an ad varies as the al-
location of displayed ads varies. Here, we adopted the cascade model, that
is the most common model used in the literature. In the paper, we studied
a number of scenarios, each with a specific information setting of unknown
parameters. For each scenario, we designed a truthful learning mechanism,
studied its economic properties, derived an upper bound over the regret, and,
19From this experiment is not clear whether RRT = O˜(q
−1
min), thus implying that RT
does not depend on qmin at all, or RRT is sublinear in qmin, which would correspond to a
dependency RT = O˜(q
−z
min) with 0 < z < 1.
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for some mechanisms, also a lower bound. We considered both the regret over
the auctioneer’s revenue and the SW.
We showed that for the cascade model with only position–dependent ex-
ternalities it is possible to design a truthful no–regret learning mechanism for
the general case in which all the parameters are unknown. Our mechanism
presents a regret O˜(T
2
3 ) and it is DSIC in expectation w.r.t. the realiza-
tion of the random component of the mechanism. However, it remains open
whether or not it is possible to obtain a regret O˜(T
1
2 ). For specific cases, in
which some parameters are known to the auctioneer, we obtained better re-
sults in terms of either incentive compatibility, obtaining dominant strategy
truthfulness, or regret, obtaining a regret of zero. We showed that for the
cascade model with the position– and ad–dependent externalities it is possi-
ble to design a DSIC a posteriori mechanism with a regret O˜(T
2
3 ) when only
the quality is unknown. Instead, even when the cascade model is only with
ad–dependent externalities and no parameter is known, it is not possible to
obtain a no–regret DSIC a posteriori mechanism. The proof of this result
would seem to suggest that the same result holds also when a random mech-
anism is adopted and the truthfulness is in expectation w.r.t. its realizations.
However, we did not produce any proof for that, leaving it for future works.
Finally, we empirically evaluated the bounds we provided, showing that the
dependency of the regret on the parameters is mostly correct in a worst–case
scenario.
Two main questions deserve future investigation. The first question con-
cerns the study of a lower bound for the case in which there are only position–
dependent externalities and truthfulness is in expectation in expectation
w.r.t. only the realizations of the random component of the mechanism or
also w.r.t. the click realizations. Furthermore, it is open whether the separa-
tion of exploration and exploitation phases is necessary and, in the negative
case, whether it is possible to obtain a regret O˜(T
1
2 ). The second question
concerns a similar study related to the case with only ad–dependent exter-
nalities.
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Appendix A. Vickrey–Clarke–Groves mechanism
Consider a generic direct–revelation mechanismM = (N ,V ,Θ, f, {pi}i∈N )
as defined in Section 3.2. Differently from the SSA case, in general the type
of an agent, denoted by vi for consistency with the rest of the paper, is a
vector of parameters. We define a function vali : Θ×V → R+, which returns
the value obtained by agent ai when its type is vi and the allocation chosen
by the mechanism is θ.
The VCG mechanism is obtained coupling the two following functions:
• the allocation function f which returns the allocation maximising the
social welfare, i.e.,
f(vˆ) = arg max
θ∈Θ
SW (θ, vˆ) = arg max
θ∈Θ
∑
i∈N
vali(θ, vˆi);
• the payment rule pi, which defines the payment required from agent ai,
i.e.,
pi(vˆ) = SW (f(vˆ−i), vˆ−i)− SW−i(f(vˆ), vˆ)
=
∑
j∈N ,j 6=i
valj(f(vˆ−i), vˆj)−
∑
j∈N ,j 6=i
valj(f(vˆ), vˆj),
where we denote by f(vˆ−i) the allocation returned by f when agent i
does not participate to the auction.
In this quasi–linear environment, when there are no interdependencies
among the types of the agents and the no–single–agent effect [3] holds, the
VCG mechanism is AE, DSIC a posteriori, IR a posteriori, and WBB a
posteriori.
Appendix B. Monotonicity and Myerson’s payments
Consider a generic direct–revelation mechanismM = (N ,V ,Θ, f, {pi}i∈N )
as defined in Section 3.2. A single–parameter linear environment is such that
• the type of each agent ai is a scalar vi (single–parameter assumption),
• the utility function of agent ai is ui(vˆ) = zi (f (vˆ)) vi − pi(vˆ) where
zi : Θ→ R is a function of the allocation (linear assumption).
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An allocation function f is monotonic in a single–parameter linear environ-
ment if for any vˆ−i
zi (f (vˆ−i, v′′i )) ≥ zi (f (vˆ−i, v′i)) ∀i ∈ N
for any v′′i ≥ v′i. Essentially, zi is monotonically increasing in vi once vˆ−i
has been fixed. In such environments, it is always possible to design a DSIC
mechanism imposing the following payments [35]:
pi(vˆ) = hi(vˆ−i) + zi (f (vˆ)) vˆi −
∫ vˆi
0
zi (f (vˆ−i, u)) du (B.1)
where hi : VN−1 → R is a generic function not depending on the type of
agent ai.
Appendix C. Proof of Revenue Regret in Theorem 2
We start by reporting the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof. (Proposition 1) The derivation is a simple application of the Hoeffd-
ing’s bound. We first notice that each of the terms in the empirical average
q˜i (Eq. 11) is bounded in [0; 1/Λpi(i;θt)]. Thus we obtain
P (|qi − q˜i| ≥ ) ≤ 2 exp
(
− 2|Bi|
22∑
t∈Bi
(
1
Λpi(i;θt)
− 0)2
)
=
δ
N
.
By reordering the terms in the previous expression we have
η =
√√√√(∑
t∈Bi
1
Λ2pi(i;θt)
)
1
2|Bi|2 log
2N
δ
,
which guarantees that all the empirical estimates q˜i are within η of qi for all
the ads with probability, at least, 1− δ. 
Before stating the main result of this section, we need the following
lemma.
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Lemma 1. For any slot sm with m ∈ K, with probability 1− δ,
max
i∈N
(qivˆi;m)
max
i∈N
(q˜+i vˆi;m)
≤ 1, (C.1)
where the operator max(·; ·) is defined as in Section 4.
Proof. The proof is a straightforward application of Proposition 1. We
consider the optimal allocation θ∗ defined in Eq. 2 and the optimal allocation
θ˜ when estimates q˜+ are adopted defined in Eq. 16. We denote h = α(m; θ∗) ∈
arg max
i∈N
(qivˆi;m), i.e., the index of the ad allocated in a generic slot in position
m. There are two possible scenarios:
• If pi(h; θ˜) < m (the ad is displayed into a higher slot in the approximated
allocation θ˜), then ∃j ∈ N s.t. pi(j; θ∗) < m ∧ pi(j; θ˜) ≥ m. Thus
max
i∈N
(q˜+i vˆi;m) ≥ q˜+j vˆj ≥ qj vˆj ≥ qhvˆh = max
i∈N
(qivˆi;m)
where the second inequality holds with probability 1− δ;
• If pi(h; θ˜) ≥ m (the ad is displayed into a lower or equal slot in the
approximated allocation θ˜), then
max
i∈N
(q˜+i vˆi;m) ≥ q˜+h vˆh ≥ qhvh = max
i∈N
(qivˆi;m)
where the second inequality holds with probability 1− δ.
In both cases, the statement follows. 
Proof. (Theorem 2)
Step 1: expected payments. The proof follows steps similar to those
in the proofs in [20]. We first recall that since the mechanism is DSIC in
expectation w.r.t. the clicks, then we can directly focus on the regret when
the actual values v are bid. For any ad ai such that pi(i; θ
∗) ≤ K, the
expected payments of the VCG mechanism in this case reduce to Eq. 9:
p∗i (v) =
K+1∑
l=pi(i;θ∗)+1
[
(Λl−1 − Λl) max
j∈N
(qjvj; l)
]
,
69
while, given the definition of A–VCG1 reported in Section 4.1, the expected
payments for at t–th iteration of the auction are
p˜i,t(v) =
{
0 if t ≤ τ (exploration)
p˜i(v) if t > τ (exploitation)
(C.2)
where the payment for any ad ai such that pi(i; θ˜) ≤ K is defined in Eq. 17
as:
p˜i(v) =
qi
q˜+i
K+1∑
l=pi(i;θ˜)+1
(Λl−1 − Λl) max
j∈N
(q˜+j vj; l).
Step 2: per–step exploration regret. Since for any 1 ≤ t ≤ τ , A–VCG1
sets all the payments to 0, the per–step regret is
rt =
K∑
m=1
(
p∗α(m;θ∗) (v)− 0
)
=
K∑
m=1
K∑
l=m
∆l max
i∈N
(qivi; l + 1) ≤ vmax
K∑
m=1
Λm,
(C.3)
where ∆l = Λl − Λl+1. The exploration regret is obtained by summing up r
over τ steps.
Step 3: per–step exploitation regret. Now we focus on the expected
(w.r.t. click realizations) per–step regret during the exploitation phase. Ac-
cording to the definition of payments, at each step t ∈ {τ + 1, . . . , T} of the
exploitation phase we bound the per–step regret r as
rt =
K∑
m=1
(
p∗α(m;θ∗) (v)− p˜α(m;θ˜) (v)
)
=
K∑
m=1
K∑
l=m
∆l
max
i∈N
(qivi; l + 1)−
max
i∈N
(q˜+i vi; l + 1)
q˜+
α(m;θ˜)
qα(m;θ˜)

=
K∑
m=1
K∑
l=m
∆l
max
i∈N
(q˜+i vi; l + 1)
q˜+
α(m;θ˜)
 maxi∈N (qivi; l + 1)
max
i∈N
(q˜+i vi; l + 1)
q˜+
α(m;θ˜)
− qα(m;θ˜)

=
K∑
m=1
K∑
l=m
∆l
max
i∈N
(q˜+i vi; l + 1)
max
i∈N
(q˜+i vi;m)
vα(m;θ˜)
 maxi∈N (qivi; l + 1)
max
i∈N
(q˜+i vi; l + 1)
q˜+
α(m;θ˜)
− qα(m;θ˜)
 .
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By definition of the max operator, since l + 1 > m, it follows that
max
i∈N
(q˜+i vi; l + 1)
max
i∈N
(q˜+i vi;m)
≤ 1. (C.4)
Finally, from Lemma 1 and vα(m;θ˜) ≤ vmax, it follows that
rt ≤
K∑
m=1
K∑
l=m
vmax∆l
(
q˜+
α(m;θ˜)
− qα(m;θ˜)
)
≤ vmax
K∑
m=1
[(
q˜+
α(m;θ˜)
− qα(m;θ˜)
) K∑
l=m
∆l
]
,
(C.5)
with probability at least 1− δ. Notice that, by definition of ∆l,
∑K
l=m ∆l =
Λm − ΛK+1 = Λm. Furthermore, from the definition of q˜+i and using Eq. 14
we have that for any ad ai:
q˜+i − qi = q˜i − qi + η ≤ 2η,
with probability at least 1 − δ. Thus, the difference between the payments
becomes
rt ≤ 2vmax
(
K∑
m=1
Λm
)
η = 2vmax
(
K∑
m=1
Λm
)√√√√( K∑
m=1
1
Λ2m
)
N
K2τ
log
N
δ
(C.6)
with probability 1− δ.20
Step 4: cumulative regret. We first consider the (low-probability) event
in which the bound on q˜+i derived in Proposition 1. In this case, we cannot
guarantee anything about the behavior of the mechanism, since the payments
are very inaccurate estimates of the CTRs, and thus the largest possible
regret is suffered. In particular, we consider the worst case loss of vmax
for each slot for each step, leading to a total regret of vmax
(∑K
m=1 Λm
)
T
with probability δ. By summing up the regrets reported in Eq. C.3 during
the exploration phase and Eq. C.6 during the exploitation phase and by
20Notice that in the logarithmic term the factor of 2 we have in Proposition 1 disappears
since in this proof we only need the one–sided version of the bound.
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considering that these bounds hold with probability at least 1 − δ (upper-
bounded by 1 in the following), we obtain an expected regret
RT ≤ vmax
(
K∑
m=1
Λm
)(
2(T − τ)
√√√√( K∑
m=1
1
Λ2m
)
N
K2τ
log
N
δ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Rei
+ τ︸︷︷︸
Rer
+ δT︸︷︷︸
Rδ
)
,
where Rei is the upper bound on the regret suffered during the exploitation
phase (which holds with probability at least 1− δ), Rer is the upper bound
on the regret suffered during the exploitation phase (which holds with prob-
ability at least 1 − δ) and Rδ is the upper bound on the regret when the
bounds do not hold (with probability at most δ). This boundcan be further
simplified, given that
∑K
m=1 Λm ≤ K, as
RT ≤ vmaxK
(
2(T − τ)
√√√√( K∑
m=1
1
Λ2m
)
N
K2τ
log
N
δ
+ τ + δT
)
. (C.7)
Step 5: parameters optimization. Beside describing the performance of
A–VCG1, the previous bound also provides guidance for the optimization of
the parameters τ and δ. We first simplify the bound in Eq. C.7 as
RT ≤ vmaxK
2T
√√√√( K∑
m=1
1
Λ2m
)
N
K2τ
log
N
δ
+ τ + δT

≤ vmaxK
(
2T
Λmin
√
N
Kτ
log
N
δ
+ τ + δT
)
, (C.8)
where we used
K∑
m=1
1/Λ2m ≤ K/Λ2min, with Λmin = minm∈K Λm. In order to
find the optimal value of τ , we take the derivative of the previous bound
w.r.t. τ , set it to zero and obtain
vmaxK
(
−τ− 32 T
Λmin
√
N
K
log
N
δ
+ 1
)
= 0,
which leads to
τ = K−
1
3T
2
3N
1
3Λ
− 2
3
min
(
log
N
δ
) 1
3
.
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Substituting this value of τ into Eq. C.8 leads to the optimized bound
RT ≤ vmaxK
(
3K−
1
3T
2
3N
1
3Λ
− 2
3
min
(
log
N
δ
) 1
3
+ δT
)
.
We are now left with the choice of the confidence parameter δ ∈ (0, 1), which
can be easily set to optimize the asymptotic rate (i.e., ignoring constants and
logarithmic factors) as
δ = K−
1
3T−
1
3N
1
3
We thus obtain the final bound
RT ≤ 4vmaxΛ−
2
3
minK
2
3T
2
3N
1
3
[
log
(
K
1
3T
1
3N
2
3
)] 13
.
We have to impose the constraints that T > N
K
(given by δ < 1) and that
T > τ , i.e., T > N
KΛ2min
log N
δ
. The two constraints imply:
T >
N
KΛ2min
max
{
log
N
δ
, 1
}
.

Appendix D. Proof of Revenue Regret in Theorem 7
Unlike the setting considered in Theorem 2, here the regret is only due
to the use of a randomized mechanism, since no parameter estimation is
actually needed.
Proof. (Theorem 7)
Step 1: payments and additional notation. We recall that according
to [35] and [45] the expected VCG payments can be written, as in Eq. 24, in
the form
p∗i (vˆ) = Λpi(i;f∗(vˆ))qivˆi −
∫ vˆi
0
Λpi(i;f∗(vˆ−i,u))qidu,
while the A–VCG2′ mechanism prescribes contingent payments as in Eq. 25,
which lead to expected payments
p∗′i (vˆ) = Ex
[
Λpi(i;f∗(x))|vˆ
]
qivˆi −
∫ vˆi
0
Ex
[
Λpi(i;f∗(x))|vˆ−i, u
]
qidu. (D.1)
Given the randomness of the allocation function of A–VCG2′, we need to
introduce the following additional notation:
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• s ∈ {0, 1}N is a vector where each element si denotes whether the i–th
bid has been preserved or it has been modified by the cSRP, i.e., if
xi = vˆi then si = 1, otherwise if xi < vˆi then si = 0. Notice that s does
not provide information about the actual modified values x;
• Ex|s[Λpi(i;f(x))|vˆ] is the expected value of prominence associated with
the slots allocated to ad ai, conditioned on the declared bids vˆ being
perturbed as in s.
Moreover, let S = {s|pi(i; f ∗(vˆ)) ≤ K + 1 ⇒ si = 1 ∀i ∈ N} be all the
realizations where the cSRP does not modify the bids of the first K + 1
ads, i.e., the K ads displayed applying f ∗ to the true bids vˆ and the first
non-allocated ad.
Step 2: cumulative regret. We proceed by studying the per–ad regret
ri(v) = p
∗
i (v)−p∗′i (v), where the advertisers bid their true values v since the
mechanism is DSIC. Given the previous definitions, we rewrite the expected
payments p∗′i (v) as
p∗′i (v) =
(
P[s ∈ S]Λpi(i;f∗(v)) + P[s 6∈ S]Ex|s6∈S[Λpi(i;f∗(x))|v]
)
qivi+
−
∫ vi
0
(
P[s ∈ S]Λpi(i;f∗(v−i,u)) + P[s 6∈ S]Ex|s 6=1[Λpi(i;f∗(x))|v−i, u]
)
qidu
= P[s ∈ S]
(
Λpi(i;f∗(v))qivi −
∫ vi
0
Λpi(i;f∗(v−i,u))qidu
)
+
+ P[s 6∈ S]
(
Ex|s6∈S[Λpi(i;f∗(x))|v]qivi −
∫ vi
0
Ex|s6∈S[Λpi(i;f∗(x))|v−i, u]qidu
)
= P[s ∈ S]p∗i (v)+
+ P[s 6∈ S]
(
Ex|s6∈S[Λpi(i;f∗(x))|v]qivi −
∫ vi
0
Ex|s6∈S[Λpi(i;f∗(x))|v−i, u]qidu
)
,
where in the last expression we used the expression of the VCG payments in
Eq. 24 according to [35] and [45]. The per–ad regret is
ri(v) = p
∗
i (v)− p∗′i (v)
= p∗i (v)− P[s ∈ S]p∗i (v)+
− P[s 6∈ S]
(
Ex|s6∈S[Λpi(i;f∗(x))|v]qivi −
∫ vi
0
Ex|s6∈S[Λpi(i;f∗(x))|v−i, u]qidu
)
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= P[s 6∈ S]p∗i (v)+
− P[s 6∈ S]
(
Ex|s6∈S[Λpi(i;f∗(x))|v]qivi −
∫ vi
0
Ex|s6∈S[Λpi(i;f∗(x))|v−i, u]qidu
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
rBi,1
.
Since we have that u ≤ vi in the integral and since the allocation function
defined in [23] is monotonic, we have that
Ex|s6∈S[Λpi(i;f∗(x))|v−i, u] ≤ Ex|s6∈S[Λpi(i;f∗(x))|v],
which implies that rBi,1 is non–negative. Thus the regret r
B
i can be bounded
as
rBi (v) = P[s 6∈ S]p∗i (v)−P[s 6∈ S]rBi,1︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
≤ P[s 6∈ S]p∗i (v) ≤ P
[∃j : sj = 0 ∧ pi(j; f ∗(v)) ≤ K + 1]vmax
≤
∑
j∈N :pi(j;f∗(v))≤K+1
P[sj = 0]vmax
= (K + 1)µvmax ≤ 2Kµvmax. (D.2)
We can now compute the bound on the global regret RT . Since this mecha-
nism does not require any estimation phase, the regret is simply
RT ≤ 2K2µvmaxT.
Step 3: parameters optimization. In this case, the bound would suggest
to choose a µ → 0, but it is necessary to consider that with µ → 0 the
variance of the payment goes to infinity.
Appendix E. Proof of Revenue Regret in Theorem 11
The proof of Theorem 11 needs to combine the result of Theorem 7 and
the regret due to the estimation of the parameters similarly to what is done
in Theorem 2.
Proof. (Theorem 11)
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Step 1: payments and the regret. Similar to the proof of Theorem 7,
we use the form of the VCG payments as in Eq. 24:
p∗i (v) = Λpi(i;f∗(v))qivi −
∫ vi
0
Λpi(i;f∗(v−i,u))qidu,
while A–VCG3 uses the contingent payments in Eq. 28, which in expectation
become
p˜′i(v) = Ex
[
Λpi(i;f˜(x))|v
]
qivi −
∫ vi
0
Ex
[
Λpi(i;f˜(x))|v−i, u
]
qidu. (E.1)
We also need to introduce the expected payments
p˜i(v) = Λpi(i;f˜(v))qivi −
∫ vi
0
Λpi(i;f˜(v−i,u))qidu,
which correspond to the VCG payments except for the use of allocation
function f˜ in place of f ∗.
Initially, we compute an upper bound over the per–ad regret ri = p
∗
i − p′i
for each step of the exploitation phase and we later use this result to compute
the upper bound for the regret RT over T steps. We divide the per–ad regret
in two different components:
ri(v) = p
∗
i (v)− p˜′i(v) (E.2)
= p∗i (v)− p∗′i (v)︸ ︷︷ ︸
cSRP regret
+ p∗′i (v)− p˜′i(v)︸ ︷︷ ︸
learning regret
= rBi (v) + r
L
i (v),
where
• rBi (v) is the regret due to the use of the approach proposed in [23]
instead of the VCG payments, when all the parameters are known;
• rLi (v) is the regret due to the uncertainty on the parameters when the
payments defined in [23] are considered.
For the definitions of s and Ex|s[Λpi(i;f(x))|v] refer to the proof of Theorem 7.
Step 2: the per–ad per–step cSRP regret. We can reuse the result
obtained in the proof of Theorem 7. In particular, we can use the bound in
Eq. D.2, i.e. rBi (v) ≤ (K + 1)µvmax. Given that we have assumed N > K,
in the remaining parts of this proof we will use the following upper bound:
rBi (v) ≤ (K + 1)µvmax ≤ Nµvmax.
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Step 3: the per–ad per–step learning regret. Similar to the previous
step, we write the learning expected payments based on the cSRP in Eq. E.1
as
p˜′i(v) = P[s = 1]p˜i(v)+
+ P[s 6= 1]
(
Ex|s6=1[Λpi(i;f˜(x))|v]qivi −
∫ vi
0
Ex|s6=1[Λpi(i;f˜(x))|v−i, u]qidu
)
.
Then the per–ad regret is
rLi (v) = p
∗′
i (v)− p˜′i(v)
= P[s = 1] (p∗i (v)− p˜i (v)) +
+ P[s 6= 1]
(
Ex|s6=1[Λpi(i;f∗(x))|v]qivi −
∫ vi
0
Ex|s6=1[Λpi(i;f∗(x))|v−i, u]qidu︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤vmax
+
−Ex|s6=1[Λpi(i;f˜(x))|v]qivi +
∫ vi
0
Ex|s 6=1[Λpi(i;f˜(x))|v−i, u]qidu︸ ︷︷ ︸
=−rBi,1≤0
)
≤ p∗i (v)− p˜i(v) + P
[∃j : sj = 0]vmax
≤ p∗i (v)− p˜i(v) +
∑
j∈N
P
[
sj = 0
]
vmax = p
∗
i (v)− p˜i(v) +Nµvmax.
We now simply notice that payments p˜i are WVCG payments corresponding
to the estimated allocation function f˜ and can be written as
p˜i(v) =
qi
q˜+i
[
S˜W
(
f˜−i (v) ,v
)− S˜W−i(f˜ (v) ,v)],
which allows us to use the results stated in proof of Theorem 2 and from
Eq. C.5 we can conclude that
∑
i:pi(i;f∗(v)≤K)
(p∗i (v)− p˜i (v)) ≤ 2vmaxη
(
K∑
m=1
Λm
)
≤ 2Kvmaxη.
Step 4: cumulative regret. We now bring together the two per–step
regrets and we have that at each step of the the exploitation phase we have
the regret r =
∑N
i=1 ri. We first notice that the expected per–step regret ri
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for each ad ai is defined as the difference between the VCG payments p
∗
i (v)
and the (expected) payments p′i(v) computed by the randomized mechanism
when the estimates q˜+ are used. We notice that p∗i (v) can be strictly positive
only for the K displayed ads, while p′i(v) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N , due to the mechanism
randomization. Thus, p∗i (v) − p′i(v) > 0 only for at most K ads. Thus we
obtain the per–step regret
r ≤
∑
i:pi(i;f∗(v))≤K
ri(v) =
∑
i:pi(i;f∗(v))≤K
(
rBi (v) + r
L
i (v)
)
≤ KNµvmax +
∑
i:pi(i;f∗(v))≤K
(p∗i (v)− p˜i (v) +Nµvmax)
≤ KNµvmax + 2Kvmaxη +KNµvmax = 2Kvmaxη + 2KNµvmax.
Finally, the global regret becomes
RT ≤ vmaxK
[
(T − τ)
(
2
√
N
τ
log
2N
δ
+ 2µN
)
+ τ + δT
]
.
Step 5: parameters optimization. We first simplify further the previous
bound as
RT ≤ vmaxK
[
T
(
2
√
N
τ
log
2N
δ
+ 2µN
)
+ τ + δT
]
. (E.3)
We first optimize the value of τ , take the derivative of the previous bound
w.r.t. τ and set it to zero and obtain
vmaxK
(
− τ− 32T
√
N log
2N
δ
+ 1
)
= 0,
which leads to
τ = T
2
3N
1
3
(
log
2N
δ
) 1
3
.
Once replaced into Eq. E.3 we obtain
RT ≤ vmaxK
[
3T
2
3N
1
3
(
log
2N
δ
) 1
3
+ 2TµN + δT
]
.
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The optimization of the asymptotic order of the bound can then be obtained
by setting µ and δ so as to equalize the orders of the second and third term
in the bound. In particular, by setting
µ = T−
1
3N−
2
3 and δ = T−
1
3N
1
3 ,
we obtain the final bound
RT ≤ 6vmaxKT 23N 13
(
log
(
2N
2
3T
1
3
)) 13
.
Notice that, since δ < 1, this implies that T > N , and, since µ < 1, it
must be the case T > N−2 > 1 that always holds. Moreover T > τ , thus
T > N log 2N
δ
.
Appendix F. Proof of Revenue Regret in Theorem 14
Before deriving the proof of Theorem 14, we prove two lemmas that we
use in what follows.
Lemma 2. Let G be an arbitrary space of allocation functions, then for any
g ∈ G, when |qi − q˜+i | ≤ η with probability 1− δ, then for any vˆ we have
−2Kvmaxη ≤ SW(g(vˆ), vˆ)− S˜W(g(vˆ), vˆ) qi
q˜+i
≤ 2Kvmax
qmin
η,
with probability 1− δ.
Proof. By using the definition of SW and S˜W we have the following se-
quence of inequalities
S˜W(g(vˆ), vˆ)
qi
q˜+i
−SW(g(vˆ), vˆ)
=
∑
j:pi(j;g(vˆ))≤K
Γpi(j;g(vˆ))(g(vˆ))vˆj
(
q˜+j
qi
q˜+i
− qj
)
≤ vmax
∑
j:pi(j;g(vˆ))≤K
(
q˜+j
qi
q˜+i
− qj
)
≤ vmax
∑
j:pi(j;g(vˆ))≤K
(q˜+j − qj) ≤ 2Kvmaxη.
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The second statement follows from
SW(g(vˆ), vˆ)−S˜W(g(vˆ), vˆ) qi
q˜+i
≤
∑
j:pi(j;g(vˆ))≤K
Γpi(j;g(vˆ))vˆj
(
qj − q˜+j
qi
q˜+i
)
≤ vmax
∑
j:pi(j;g(vˆ))≤K
(
qj − qj qi
q˜+i
+ qj
qi
q˜+i
− q˜+j
qi
q˜+i
)
= vmax
∑
j:pi(j;g(vˆ))≤K
[
qj
(
q˜+i − qi
q˜+i
)
+ (qj − q˜+j )︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
qi
q˜+i
]
≤ vmax
qmin
∑
j:pi(j;g(vˆ))≤K
(q˜i − qi + η) ≤ 2Kvmax
qmin
η.

Lemma 3. Let G be an arbitrary space of allocation functions, then for any
g ∈ G, when |qi − q˜+i | ≤ η with probability 1− δ, we have
0 ≤
(
S˜W(g(vˆ), vˆ)− SW(g(vˆ), vˆ)
)
≤ 2Kvmaxη,
with probability 1− δ.
Proof. The first inequality follows from
SW(g(vˆ), vˆ)− S˜W(g(vˆ), vˆ)
=
∑
j:pi(j;g(vˆ))≤K
Γpi(j;g(vˆ))(g(vˆ))vˆj
(
qj − q˜+j
)
≤ vmax
∑
j:pi(j;g(vˆ))≤K
(qj − q˜+j ) ≤ 0,
while the second inequality follows from
S˜W(g(vˆ), vˆ)−SW(g(vˆ), vˆ)
=
∑
j:pi(j;g(vˆ))≤K
Γpi(j;g(vˆ))(g(vˆ))vˆj
(
q˜+j − qj
)
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≤ vmax
∑
j:pi(j;g(vˆ))≤K
(
q˜+j − qj
)
= vmax
∑
j:pi(j;g(vˆ))≤K
(q˜j + η − qj) ≤ 2Kvmaxη.

We are now ready to proceed with the proof of Theorem 14.
Proof. (Theorem 14)
Step 1: per–ad per–step regret. We first compute the per–step per–ad
regret ri = p
∗
i (v) − p˜i(v) at each step of the exploitation phase for each ad
ai. According to the definition of payments we have
ri = SW(f
∗
−i(v),v)− S˜W(f˜−i(v),v)
qi
q˜+i︸ ︷︷ ︸
r1i
+ S˜W−i(f˜(v),v)
qi
q˜+i
− SW−i(f ∗(v),v)︸ ︷︷ ︸
r2i
.
We bound the first term through Lemma 2 and the following inequalities
r1i = SW(f
∗
−i(v),v)− S˜W(f ∗−i(v),v)
qi
q˜+i
+ S˜W(f ∗−i(v),v)
qi
q˜+i
− S˜W(f˜−i(v),v) qi
q˜+i
≤ max
f∈F−i
(
SW(f(v),v)− S˜W(f(v),v) qi
q˜+i
)
+
(
S˜W(f ∗−i(v),v)− max
f∈F−i
S˜W(f˜(v),v)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
qi
q˜+i
≤ 2Kvmax
qmin
η,
with probability 1− δ. We rewrite r2i as
r2i =
(
S˜W(f˜(v),v)− Γpi(i;f˜(v))(f˜(v))q˜+i vi
) qi
q˜+i
− SW(f ∗(v),v) + Γpi(i;f∗(v))(f ∗(v))qivi
= S˜W(f˜(v),v)
qi
q˜+i
− SW(f ∗(v),v)︸ ︷︷ ︸
r3i
+
(
Γpi(i;f∗(v)) (f
∗(v))− Γpi(i;f˜(v))(fˆ(v))
)
qivi.
We now focus on the term r3i and use Lemma 2 to bound it as
r3i = S˜W(f˜(v),v)
qi
q˜+i
− SW(f˜(v),v) + SW(f˜(v),v)−max
f∈F
SW(f(v),v)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
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≤ max
f∈F
(
S˜W(f(v),v)
qi
q˜+i
− SW(f(v),v)
)
≤ 2Kvmaxη.
Step 2: exploitation and cumulative regret. We define I = {i ∈
N| pi(i; f˜ (v)) ≤ K ∨ pi(i; f˜(v)) ≤ K}, |I| ≤ 2K. It is clear that only the ads
ai s.t. i ∈ I have a regret ri 6= 0. The other ads, i 6∈ I, have both p∗i (v) = 0
and p˜i(v) = 0. Thus, we can bound the regret r, at each exploitative step,
in the following way
r =
∑
i∈I
(r1i + r
2
i )
≤
∑
i∈I
(2Kvmax
qmin
η + 2Kvmaxη
)
+
∑
i∈I
(
Γpi(i;f∗(v))(f
∗(v))− Γpi(i;f˜(v))(f˜(v))
)
qivi
=
∑
i∈I
(2Kvmax
qmin
η + 2Kvmaxη
)
+
N∑
i=1
(
Γpi(i;f∗(v))(f
∗(v))− Γpi(i;f˜(v))(f˜(v))
)
qivi
≤ 8K
2vmax
qmin
η + SW(f ∗(v),v)− SW(f˜(v),v)
=
8K2vmax
qmin
η + SW(f ∗(v),v)− S˜W(f ∗(v),v)+
+ S˜W(f ∗(v),v)−max
f∈F
S˜W(f)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+S˜W(f˜(v),v)− SW(f˜(v),v)
≤ 8K
2vmax
qmin
η + SW(f ∗(v),v)− S˜W(f ∗(v),v)︸ ︷︷ ︸
r1
+ S˜W(f˜(v),v)− SW(f˜(v),v)︸ ︷︷ ︸
r2
.
The remaining terms r1 and r2 can be easily bounded using Lemma 3 as
r1 ≤ 0 and r2 ≤ 2Kvmaxη.
Summing up all the terms we finally obtain
r ≤ 10K
2vmax
qmin
η
with probability 1−δ. Now, considering the per–step regret of the exploration
and exploitation phases, we obtain the final bound on the cumulative regret
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RT as follows
RT ≤ vmaxK
[
10K
Γminqmin
(T − τ)
√
N
Kτ
log
2N
δ
+ τ + δT
]
.
Step 3: parameter optimization. Let c := 5
Γminqmin
, then we first simplify
the previous bound as
RT ≤ vmaxK
[
2cT
√
NK
τ
log
2N
δ
+ τ + δT
]
.
Taking the derivative w.r.t. τ leads to
vmaxK
(
− τ− 32 cT
√
NK log
2N
δ
+ 1
)
= 0,
which leads to
τ = c
2
3K
1
3T
2
3N
1
3
(
log
2N
δ
) 1
3
.
Once replaced in the bound, we obtain
RT ≤ vmaxK
[
3c
2
3K
1
3T
2
3N
1
3
(
log
2N
δ
) 1
3
+ δT
]
.
Finally, we choose δ to optimize the asymptotic order by setting
δ = c
2
3K
1
3T−
1
3N
1
3 ,
which leads to the final bound
RT ≤ 4vmaxc 23K 43T 23N 13
(
log
2N
2
3T
1
3
K
1
3 c
2
3
) 1
3
.
Notice that this bound imposes constraints on the value of T , indeed, T > τ ,
thus T > c
2
3K
1
3T
2
3N
1
3
(
log 2N
δ
) 1
3 and δ < 1, thus T > c2KN , leading to:
T > c2KN max
{
log
2N
δ
, 1
}
.
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The problem associated with the previous bound is that τ and δ depends
on qmin, which is an unknown quantity. Thus actually choosing this value
to optimize the bound may be unfeasible. An alternative choice of τ and δ
is obtained by optimizing the bound removing the dependency on qmin. Let
d := 5
Γmin
, then we choose
τ = d
2
3K
1
3T
2
3N
1
3
(
log
2N
δ
) 1
3
,
and
δ = K
1
3N
1
3d
2
3T−
1
3 .
This leads to the final bound
RT ≤ 4vmaxK 43T 23N 13 d
2
3
qmin
(
log
2N
2
3T
1
3
K
1
3d
2
3
) 1
3
Given that δ < 1, this implies that T > KNd2, and T > τ implies T >
d2KN log 2N
δ
. Together they impose
T > d2KN max
{
log
2N
δ
, 1
}
.

Appendix G. Deviation Regret
The definition of regret in Eq. 5 measures the cumulative difference be-
tween the revenue of the VCG compared to the one obtained by A–VCG1 over
T steps. Upper–bounds over this quantity guarantees that the loss in terms
of revenue does not increase linearly with T . As illustrated in the previous
sections, the key passage in the proofs is the upper–bounding of the regret at
each step of the exploitation phase (i.e., r =
∑N
i=1(p
∗
i (v)− p˜i(v))). Nonethe-
less, we notice that this quantity could be negative as well. In this section we
introduce a different notion of regret (R˜T ) that we study only for A–VCG1,
leaving for the future a more comprehensive analysis of the other algorithms.
Let us consider the following simple example. Let N = 3, K = 1, vi = 1
for all the ads, and q1 = 0.1, q2 = 0.2, and q3 = 0.3. Let assume that after
the exploration phase we have q˜+1 = 0.1, q˜
+
2 = 0.29, q˜
+
3 = 0.3. The standard
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VCG mechanism allocates ad a3 and asks for a payment p
∗
3(v) = 0.2. During
the exploitation phase A–VCG1 also allocates a3 but asks for an (expected)
payment p˜3(v) = (q˜
+
2 /q˜
+
3 )q3 = 0.29. Thus, the regret in each exploitation
step is r = p∗3(v)− p˜3(v) = −0.09. Although this result might seem surpris-
ing, it is due to the fact that while both A–VCG1 and VCG are truthful, in
general A–VCG1 is not AE. We recall that a mechanism is AE if for any set
of advertisers it always maximizes the social welfare. In the example, if for
instance the true quality of ad a3 is q3 = 0.28, then the allocation induced by
q˜+s is not efficient anymore. For this reason, we characterized the behavior
of A–VCG1 compared to the VCG considering the deviation between their
payments, defined as
R˜T (A) =
T∑
t=1
∣∣∣ N∑
i=1
(p∗i,t − p˜i,t)
∣∣∣. (G.1)
where we consider the definition of p˜i in Eq. C.2. We leave to further inves-
tigation the study of this regret for the other considered mechanisms.
Theorem 18. Let us consider a sequential auction with N advertisers, K
slots, and T steps with position–dependent cascade model with parameters
{Λm}Km=1 and accuracy η as defined in Eq. 14. For any parameter τ ∈
{1, . . . , T} and δ ∈ (0, 1), the A–VCG1 achieves an auctioneer’s revenue
expected regret:
R˜T ≤ Kvmax
(
2
qmin
(T − τ) η + τ + δT
)
(G.2)
where qmin = mini∈N qi. By setting the parameters to
• δ = N 13K− 13T− 13 ,
• τ = K−
1
3N
1
3 T
2
3
Λ
2
3
min
(
log N
δ
) 1
3 ,
the regret is
R˜T ≤ 4K
− 1
3N
1
3T
2
3
qminΛ
2
3
min
(
logN
2
3K
1
3T
1
3
) 1
3
. (G.3)
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Proof. We initially provide a bound over the per–step regret during the
exploitation phase. We consider the two sides of the bound separately. We
have that for the first side of the bound we can use the result provided in
Step 3 in the proof of Theorem 2, i.e.,
r1 =
K∑
m=1
(p∗α(m;θ∗)(v)− p˜α(m;θ˜)(v))
≤ 2Kvmaxη,
with probability 1− δ. Now we bound the other side.
r2 =
K∑
m=1
(
p˜α(m;θ˜)(v)− p∗α(m;θ∗)(v)
)
=
K∑
m=1
K∑
l=m
∆l
maxi∈N (q˜+i vi; l + 1)
q˜+
α(m;θ˜)
qα(m;θ˜) −max
i∈N
(qivi; l + 1)

≤ max
i∈N
(qivi; l + 1)
K∑
m=1
K∑
l=m
∆l
maxi∈N (q˜+i vi; l + 1)
max
i∈N
(qivi; l + 1)
− 1
 .
In order to proceed we need to bound the ratio in the inner term. We first
recall that for any ad ai, we have that q˜
+
i vi = (q˜i + η) vi ≤ (qi + 2η) vi. Let
i′ ∈ arg max
j∈N
(qjvj; l + 1) be the ad displayed in sl+1 when the true qualities
are known. We distinguish two cases:
• The ad ai′ shifts from slot l + 1 to a higher precedence slot when allo-
cated according to f˜ , i.e., pi(i′; f˜(v)) ≤ l + 1. In this case we have
max
i∈N
(q˜+i vi; l + 1)
max
i∈N
(qivi; l + 1)
≤ q˜
+
i′ vi′
qi′vi′
≤ 1 + 2η
qmin
.
• The ad ai′ shifts from slot l+1 to a lower precedence slot when allocated
according to f˜ , i.e., pi(i′; f˜(v)) > l+1. In this case, there must exist an
ad j that in the exact allocation is allocated after i′ but it is promoted
to a higher precedence slot according to f˜ . This corresponds to a j ∈ N
such that pi(j; f ∗(v)) ≥ l+1 but pi(j; f˜(v)) < l+1. As a result we have
max
i∈N
(q˜+i vi; l + 1)
max
i∈N
(qivi; l + 1)
≤ q˜
+
j vj
qi′vi′
≤ qjvj + 2ηvj
qi′vi′
≤ qjvj + 2η
qj
qmin
vj
qi′vi′
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≤ qi
′vi′ + 2η
qi′
qmin
vi′
qi′vi′
≤ 1 + 2η
qmin
.
Using these results we obtain
r2 ≤ vmax
K∑
m=1
K∑
l=m
∆l
(
1 +
1
qmin
2η − 1
)
≤ vmax 1
qmin
2η
K∑
m=1
K∑
l=m
∆l︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Λm
≤ vmax 1
qmin
2ηK.
with probability 1− δ. As a result we have∣∣∣∣∣
K∑
m=1
(p∗α(m;θ∗)(v)− p˜α(m;θ˜)(v))
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 2vmaxK ηqmin ,
with probability 1− δ. The final bound on the expected regret is thus
R˜T ≤ Kvmax
(
2
qmin
(T − τ) η + τ + δT
)
. (G.4)
We first simplify the previous bound as
R˜T ≤ Kvmax
 2T
qmin
√√√√( K∑
m=1
1
Λ2m
)
N
K2τ
log
N
δ
+ τ + δT

≤ Kvmax
(
2T
qminΛmin
√
N
Kτ
log
N
δ
+ τ + δT
)
and choosing the parameters
τ =
K−
1
3N
1
3T
2
3
Λ
2
3
min
(
log
N
δ
) 1
3
,
δ = N
1
3K−
1
3T−
1
3 ,
the final bound is
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R˜T ≤ 4K
− 1
3N
1
3T
2
3
qminΛ
2
3
min
(
logN
2
3K
1
3T
1
3
) 1
3
.
The fact δ < 1 implies that T > N
K
, and T > τ implies T > K
−1N
Λ2min
log N
δ
.
Together they constrain
T >
N
KΛ2min
max
{
log
N
δ
, 1
}
.

Remark (the bound). We notice that the bound is very similar to the
bound for the regret RT but now an inverse dependency on qmin appears.
This suggests that bounding the deviation between the two mechanisms is
more difficult than bounding the revenue loss and that, as the qualities be-
come smaller, the A–VCG1 could be less and less efficient and, thus, have a
larger and larger revenue. This result has two important implications. (i) If
SW maximization is an important requirement in the design of the learning
mechanism, we should analyze the loss of A–VCG1 in terms of social welfare
and provide (probabilistic) guarantees about the number of steps the learn-
ing mechanism need in order to be AE (see [17] for a similar analysis). (ii)
If social welfare is not a priority, this result implies that a learning mecha-
nism could be preferable w.r.t. the standard VCG mechanism. We believe
that further theoretical analysis and experimental validation are needed to
understand better both aspects.
Appendix H. Proofs of Social-Welfare Regret in Theorems 3 and 15
Before stating the main result of this section, we need the following tech-
nical lemma.
Lemma 4. Let us consider an auction with N advertisers, K slots, and
T steps, and a mechanism that separates the exploration (τ steps) and the
exploitation phases (T − τ steps). Consider an arbitrary space of allocation
functions G, g˜ ∈ arg maxg′∈G S˜W (g′(vˆ), vˆ) and |qi − q˜+i | ≤ η with probability
1 − δ. For any g ∈ G, an upper bound of SW regret RSWT of the mechanism
adopting g˜ instead of g is:
RSWT ≤ vmaxK [2(T − τ)η + τ + δT ] .
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Proof. We now prove the bound on the social welfare, starting from the
cumulative per–step regret during the exploitation phase.
r = SW(g(vˆ), vˆ)− SW(g˜(vˆ), vˆ)
= SW(g(vˆ), vˆ)− S˜W(g(vˆ), vˆ)+
+ S˜W(g(vˆ), vˆ)−max
g′∈G
S˜W(g′(vˆ), vˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
+S˜W(g˜(vˆ), vˆ)− SW(g˜(vˆ), vˆ)
≤ SW(g(vˆ), vˆ)− S˜W(g(vˆ), vˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
r1
+ S˜W(g˜(vˆ), vˆ)− SW(g˜(vˆ), vˆ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
r2
.
The two remaining terms r1 and r2 can be easily bounded by using Lemma 3
r ≤ r1 + r2 ≤ 0 + 2Kvmaxη = 2Kvmaxη
with probability 1− δ.
Thus, we can conclude that:
RSWT ≤ vmaxK [2(T − τ)η + τ + δT ] .

Proof. (Theorem 3)
Step 1: cumulative regret. We apply Lemma 4 to the position–dependent
cascade model with {qi}i∈N unknowns, obtaining
RSWT ≤ vmaxK [2(T − τ)η + τ + δT ]
≤ vmaxK
[
2
Λmin
(T − τ)
√
N
Kτ
log
2N
δ
+ τ + δT
]
.
Step 2: parameter optimization. First we notice that adopting the value
of the parameters identified in Theorem 2 we obtain an upper bound O˜(T
2
3 )
for the global regret RSWT .
In order to find values that better optimize the bound over RSWT , let
e := 1
Λmin
, then we first simplify the previous bound as
RSWT ≤ vmaxK
[
2e
√
N
Kτ
log
2N
δ
+ τ + δT
]
.
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Taking the derivative of the previous bound w.r.t. τ leads to
vmaxK
(
−τ− 32 eT
√
N
K
log
2N
δ
+ 1
)
= 0,
which leads to
τ = e
2
3T
2
3N
1
3K−
1
3
(
log
2N
δ
) 1
3
.
Once replaced in the bound, we obtain
RSWT ≤ vmaxK
[
3e
2
3T
2
3N
1
3K−
1
3
(
log
2N
δ
) 1
3
+ δT
]
.
Finally, we choose δ to optimize the asymptotic order by setting
δ = e
2
3K−
1
3T−
1
3N
1
3
The final bound is
RSWT ≤ 4vmaxe
2
3K
2
3T
2
3N
1
3
(
log 2e−
2
3N
2
3K
1
3T
1
3
) 1
3
.
Given that δ < 1 this implies that T > e2K−1N . This constrain is satisfied
imposing T > τ , i.e.,
T > e2K−1N log
2N
δ
.

Proof. (Theorem 15)
Step 1: cumulative regret. We apply Lemma 4 to the model with
position– and ad–dependent externalities with {qi}i∈N unknowns, obtaining
RSWT ≤ vmaxK [2(T − τ)η + τ + δT ]
≤ vmaxK
[
2
Γmin
(T − τ)
√
N
Kτ
log
2N
δ
+ τ + δT
]
.
Step 2: parameter optimization. First we notice that adopting the value
of the parameters identified in Theorem 14 we obtain an upper bound O˜(T
2
3 )
for the global regret RSWT .
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In order to find values that better optimize the bound over RSWT , it is
possible to use the procedure followed in the proof of Theorem 3 with e :=
1
Γmin
:
RSWT ≤ 4vmaxe
2
3K
2
3N
1
3T
2
3
(
log 2e−
2
3N
2
3K
1
3T
1
3
) 1
3
.

Appendix I. Proof of Social-Welfare Regret in Theorem 8
Proof. (Theorem 8)
The bound over the SW regret RSWT can be easily derived considering
that each bid is modified by the cSRP with a probability of µ. Thus we
can define S ′ = {s′|s′ ∈ {0, 1}N , pi(i; f ∗(vˆ)) ≤ K ⇒ s′i = 1}, i.e., the set of
the random realizations where the cSRP does not modify the bids of the ads
displayed when the allocation function f ∗ is applied to the true bids vˆ. Thus
we have:
RSWT ≤ T
P [s ∈ S ′] · 0 + P [s 6∈ S ′]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤Kµ
Kvmax
 ≤ K2µvmaxT.

Appendix J. Proof of Social-Welfare Regret Theorem 12
Proof. (Theorem 12)
Step 1: per–step regret. We start computing the per–step regret over the
SW during the exploitation phase.
First of all we introduce the following definition: S ′ = {s′|s′ ∈ {0, 1}N , pi(i; f ∗(vˆ)) ≤
K ⇒ s′i = 1}, i.e., the set of the random realization where the cSRP does
not modify the bids of the ads displayed when the allocation function is f ∗
is applied to the true bids vˆ.
We now provide the bound over the regret.
r = SW(f ∗(vˆ), vˆ)− Ex
[
SW(f˜(x), vˆ)|vˆ
]
= P[s ∈ S ′]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤1
(
SW(f ∗(vˆ), vˆ)− Ex|s∈S′
[
SW(f˜(x), vˆ)|vˆ
])
+
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+ P[s 6∈ S ′]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤Kµ
(
SW(f ∗(vˆ), vˆ)− Ex|s6∈S′
[
SW(f˜(x),v)|vˆ
])
≤ SW(f ∗(vˆ), vˆ)− Ex|s∈S′
[
SW(f˜(x), vˆ)|vˆ
]
+
+Kµ
SW(f ∗(vˆ), vˆ)− Ex|s6∈S′ [SW(f˜(x),v)|vˆ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤Kvmax
≤ SW(f ∗(vˆ), vˆ)− Ex|s∈S′
[
S˜W(f ∗(x), vˆ)|vˆ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
r1≤0
+
+ Ex|s∈S′
[
S˜W(f ∗(x), vˆ)|vˆ
]
− Ex|s∈S′
[
S˜W(f˜(x), vˆ)|vˆ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
r2≤0
+
+ Ex|s∈S′
[
S˜W(f˜(x), vˆ)|vˆ
]
− Ex|s∈S′
[
SW(f˜(x), vˆ)|vˆ
]
+ vmaxµK
2
≤ max
f∈F
(
Ex|s∈S′
[
S˜W(f(x), vˆ)− SW(f(x), vˆ)|vˆ
])
+ vmaxµK
2
≤ max
f∈F
 ∑
j:pi(j;f(x))≤K
Λpi(j;f(x))vj(q˜j − qj)
+ vmaxµK2
≤ vmax max
f∈F
 ∑
j:pi(j;f(x))≤K
(q˜j − qj)
+ vmaxµK2
≤ 2vmaxKη + vmaxµK2 = vmaxK (2η +Kµ) .
We provide a brief intuition of bounds r1 and r2. The bound r1 can be
explained noticing that when the bids of the ads displayed in f ∗(vˆ) are not
modified we have that α(m; f ∗(vˆ)) = α(m; f ∗(x)) where m ≤ K and x s.t.
s ∈ S ′. The bound for r2 can be understood noticing that when the bids
of the ads s.t. pi(j; f ∗(x)) ≤ K are not modified and xi ≤ vˆi ∀i ∈ N , we
obtain S˜W(f ∗(x), vˆ) = S˜W(f ∗(x),x) ≤ maxθ∈Θ S˜W(θ,x) = S˜W(f˜(x),x) ≤
S˜W(f˜(x), vˆ).
Step 2: cumulative regret. We can now compute the upper bound for
the global regret
RSWT ≤ vmaxK [(T − τ)(2η +Kµ) + τ + δT ]
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≤ vmaxK
[
(T − τ)
(
2
√
N
τ
log
2N
δ
+Kµ
)
+ τ + δT
]
.
Step 3: parameter optimization. We first simplify the previous bound
as
RSWT ≤ vmaxK
[
2T
√
N
τ
log
2N
δ
+KµT + τ + δT
]
.
Taking the derivative of the previous bound w.r.t. τ leads to
vmaxK
(
−τ− 32T
√
N log
2N
δ
+ 1
)
= 0,
which leads to
τ = T
2
3N
1
3
(
log
2N
δ
) 1
3
.
Once replaced τ in the bound, we obtain
RSWT ≤ 3vmaxKT
2
3N
1
3
(
log
2N
δ
) 1
3
+ µK2vmaxT + δvmaxKT.
Finally, we choose δ and µ to optimize the asymptotic order by setting
δ = T−
1
3N
1
3 ,
µ = K−1T−
1
3N
1
3 .
The final bound is
RSWT ≤ 5 · vmaxKT
2
3N
1
3
(
log 2T
1
3N
2
3
) 1
3
.
Given that δ < 1 this implies that T > N and, given that µ < 1 we have
that T > N
K3
. Both the constraints are satisfied imposing T > τ , i.e.,
T > N log
2N
δ
.

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